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I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of the professional responsibilities of American lawyers
tend to ask one of two questions. One question (the macro question) is
whether a particular rule strikes the right balance among the multiple
interests it purports to reconcile—those of clients, lawyers, adverse parties,
courts and other tribunals, and the overall claims of the system of justice
based on the rule of law. The second question (the micro question) asks
whether in a particular circumstance a lawyer’s or law firm’s behavior
complied with the governing rules. I want briefly to distinguish these two
lines of inquiry from yet a third question, my focus here. What is the
responsibility of the profession itself when, through its various institutions
and especially bar associations, it asks courts or (less often) lawmakers or
agencies to adopt particular rules governing the conduct of lawyers? In
other words, my subject is the professional responsibility of the legal
profession itself, not the conduct of individual lawyers or the correctness of
any particular rule. My purpose is to suggest how the work of devising the
rules, not the content of a specific rule, might be improved.
The American Bar Association (ABA)—through its staff and the
lawyers who volunteer their time—contributes thousands of hours yearly to
developing professional conduct rules for lawyers. It is unique in this regard
among private organizations, not only in the nation, but, I suspect, also in the
world. Overall, its work has been an immense help to courts and lawmakers
and thereby has benefitted the rule of law. I have been privileged to serve
on two ABA commissions.
In 2000–2002, I served on the
Multijurisdictional Practice (“MJP”) Commission, which, among other
recommendations, proposed rules to recognize temporary cross-border
practice in the United States.1 More recently, beginning in August of 2009
and continuing through February 2013, I have served on the Commission on

1. These were adopted by the ABA’s House of Delegates. The story is told in Stephen Gillers,
Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 685 (2002). The MJP rules on temporary cross-border domestic practice by American lawyers
appear in Rule 5.5(c). MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.5(c) (2009). That rule has
been adopted in the same or substantially similar form in forty-four American jurisdictions as of
September 2011. State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5 (Multijurisdictional Practice of
Law), AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/quick_guide_5_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Ethics 20/20.2 These have been professionally gratifying experiences and
have underscored for me (not that it was necessary) the centrality of the
Association’s work to the American legal system. While this article
identifies some of what I consider to be shortcomings in the way the ABA or
its constituents have gone about the Association’s business, it does so in
order to help make an excellent enterprise even better.
Anyone who spends time among both the legal academics who study
and write about the rules governing lawyers and also practicing lawyers who
engage with the same subject through bar work or in representing clients
quickly notices differences in emphasis and orientation between the two
groups. It can sometimes seem that they are not talking about the same
thing, that the questions asked by the law teachers are far removed from the
practical concerns of the practicing lawyers. Perhaps this is just a further
example of what Harry Edwards saw twenty years ago as the “growing
disjunction” between academic and practicing lawyers.3 This Article falls
on the practical side of that divide. That is where I feel most comfortable

2. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
3. Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). In a follow up article, Judge Edwards wrote:
In legal education, the principal problem that I see nowadays is the lack of a healthy
balance between “impractical” and “practical” teaching and scholarship. By “practical,”
I mean teaching and scholarship that is both prescriptive, in the sense that it instructs
lawyers, judges, and other legal decisionmakers on how to resolve legal issues, and also
doctrinal, in the sense that it gives due weight to the various constraining sources of law,
namely precedents, statutes, and constitutions. The paradigm example of “practical
scholarship” is the law treatise. In contrast to the “practical” theory employed by the
“practical” scholar, the “impractical” scholar's scholarship consists of “abstract” theory
divorced from legal doctrine—that is, divorced from the authoritative sources of law that
necessarily constrain the arguments available to a legal professional.
Harry Edwards, Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession,” 69 WASH. L. REV. 561, 564 (1994). It bears emphasis that Judge Edwards
did not wish to ban theory from legal academia. He was looking for the proper balance. At the
Fourth Circuit’s Judicial Conference in 2011, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed his agreement
with the Edwards’ view albeit with a dose of parody:
Specifically Roberts claimed that legal scholarship is not relevant to the work of lawyers
and judges, saying he is on the same page with Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who believes there is a great “disconnect between the
academy and the profession.” Roberts continued, “Pick up a copy of any law review that
you see, and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on
evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of
great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.”
Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts/ Take on Academic Scholarship, AM. CONST. SOC’Y
(July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2%
80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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and believe I have something to add. The explanation no doubt lies in the
nine years I spent representing clients before coming to teach, the inordinate
amount of time I spend listening to the problems and concerns of lawyers in
venues where they tend to gather, and in years of experience on bar groups
doing the focused and detailed, even mundane, work of writing and
rewriting sentences that will eventually find their way into court rules that
lawyers must obey. You can hardly imagine a task more practical than that.
In any event, my bar association experience has given me, I hope, a good
basis to address, with some specificity, a question rarely raised in academic
literature—namely, the rules the legal profession should follow when it
drafts rules it will then propose for itself.4
II. A LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISTINGUISHED
What does it mean to be a lawyer in the United States? Lawyers will
likely tell you that their identity (and therefore their professional
responsibility) is defined by service to clients. Their job is to work
diligently to achieve a client’s goals within the bounds of the law and
professional conduct rules. No more, no less. (Well, maybe more, because
no rule forbids a lawyer, as part of a representation, from discussing
extralegal considerations with a client.) Lawyers will cross no forbidden
lines, but within the lines they will serve their clients as best they can. Are
they willing to work injustice? That may be an uncomfortable question, but
it is not a hard one. Lawyers are agents of their clients before the law and
their clients’ fiduciaries.5 They are not agents of the justice system or of
justice. Their job is to do the job lawfully and ethically. Furthermore, the
question assumes lawyers can even know where justice lies in a particular
matter. Often they cannot know. Life is messy. Facts shift. The equities
4. The unquestioned premise of this Article is that the ABA should and will continue to do the
labor intensive job of drafting and proposing rules governing the bar, both rules of professional
conduct and other rules, like the Model Foreign Legal Consultant Rule, MODEL RULE FOR THE
LICENSING AND PRACTICE OF FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS (2006), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/FLC.authcheckdam.pdf, the Model
Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission, MODEL RULE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION (2002), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/mode
l_rule_pro_hac_vice.authcheckdam.pdf, and the Model Rule on Admission by Motion, MODEL
RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/model_rule_admission_motion.authcheckdam.pd
f, to name a few. The Association’s work has been questioned, most prominently in Richard Abel’s
much-cited article whose provocative title reveals his skepticism. Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA
Promulgate Ethics Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981). Questions that start with “Why should it?”
and “Why does it?” are, of course, legitimate. But the Association has decided that it should and so
it does. For someone like me, whose work is almost entirely wrapped up in the world of the
practicing bar and the rules that do and should govern its members, that’s enough of a reason to sign
on.
5. Matter of Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. App. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16, cmt. b (2000) (“A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .”).
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change. What was clear yesterday may become cloudy tomorrow. But even
when lawyers do know where justice lies, justice is not part of their job
description.6 The public may have a hard time understanding that, but for
the bar it’s a truism. Defensively, lawyers may protest that they are not
insensitive to fairness and justice. When not acting for clients, they may
insist that they are as devoted to justice as any other man or woman, maybe
more than most given their training. And they are willing to discuss fairness
and justice with a client when the situation invites it. But, in the end, it is a
client’s decision whether to subordinate her legal rights and goals to other
values, which may differ from the lawyer’s values.
Despite what lawyers know as a truism, popular culture and law
professors freely exploit the differences between what the public and law
students (at least first-year students) might say justice requires or forbids and
what a governing rule may forbid or require. Examples of such conduct
might include defending a person the lawyer knows to be guilty of a crime
(usually a horrific one); cross-examining an adverse witness with the goal of
exposing him as a liar when the lawyer knows he is telling the truth;
asserting a statute of limitations or technical defense to a needy plaintiff’s
rightful claims, on behalf of a wealthy defendant; asking a jury to draw an
inference from true evidence properly admitted when the lawyer knows that
the inference is false; exploiting as far as the rules permit the factual and
legal ignorance of the inexperienced opposing lawyer; or through a narrow
reading of discovery demands finding a defensible way to deny an adverse
party documentary evidence that would advance or even clinch her claim.
While questions about the rightness of such behavior may be appealing
to pose in law school classes, and for books, films, and television to use to
cast doubt on the “morality” of the bar, individual lawyers who engage in it
cannot fairly be criticized. The tactics, ordinarily required if they benefit the
client, are all part of the adversary system, the legal equivalent of laissez
faire economics, and that’s enough of an answer for lawyers. How can a
person be criticized for doing what the law and rules demand (or for not
doing what they forbid), laws and rules that she has taken an oath to honor?
She can’t. Yes, perhaps she can be criticized for accepting a matter in the
first place if she will then be obligated to act unjustly though lawfully,
assuming she can know it at the outset. However, criticism for choosing to
accept the representation of clients whom the critic deems unworthy is not
based on the lawyer’s behavior as a lawyer for a client but on her choices as
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (detailing a lawyer’s
duties to a client, essentially constituting a lawyer’s job description, but making no mention—either
in the main text or in the comments that follow—of a duty to obtain justice).
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a person.7 Once the matter is accepted, the lawyer’s duty is to expeditiously
pursue the client’s goals within the bounds of the law and rules of
professional conduct unless there are valid reasons to withdraw.8
Sometimes, however, a lawyer does have discretion. I do not mean
discretion about how to handle a matter—strategic discretion—which
lawyers must have as professionals. I mean discretion to do what is right, as
they see it, because the lawyer’s conduct is not dictated by ethics rules or
legal obligations. Even if a lawyer is never in one of these discretionary
situations, how she would choose if she were serves to construct her
professional identity. For example, the exceptions to confidentiality are
permissive, not mandatory,9 except when necessary to remedy perjury or
other fraud on a tribunal.10 These are the most obvious discretionary rules.
Do (or would) lawyers use that discretion, how often, and when? Other
discretionary rules include the freedom of a lawyer in advising a client to
“refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation;”11
the authority to withdraw from a matter—or seek permission to withdraw—
when, among other reasons, “the client insists upon taking action that the
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement;”12 and the rules’ encouragement (not a requirement) that
lawyers do some work without fee (pro bono publico).13
Freedom to choose carries responsibility for how we choose. So the
public and other lawyers can properly criticize how a lawyer chooses when
choice is allowed. In theory, at least, how lawyers exercise the several
opportunities for discretion could yield rich information. We could begin to
discern American lawyers’ conception of their professional identity—
beyond the duty to represent clients within the bounds of law and ethics
rules—if somehow, momentarily omniscient, we could know all of the
discretionary choices made by all American lawyers in the span of, say, a
year. Perhaps social scientists will someday devise a series of hypothetical
questions the answers to which will yield a statistically reliable substitute for
omniscience and tell us more than we can now know about the professional
identity of the American bar. But for the moment, at least, that information
is beyond us.
Distinct from both the professional responsibility of individual lawyers
7. This statement requires a qualification. The lawyer may contend that although she had no
duty to accept the matter, doing so fulfills the promise of the legal system that persons in need of
counsel will be able to get a lawyer, at least if they can afford it.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b) (2009).
10. Id. R. 3.3(b)–(c).
11. Id. R. 2.1.
12. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).
13. Id. R. 6.1.
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and inquiry into the language of professional conduct rules is a third
question. What is the responsibility of the bar when it proposes such rules
for courts or lawmakers to adopt? To that question I now turn.
Part III identifies the postulates that should guide us in defining the legal
profession’s public responsibility.14 Part IV addresses responsibility for
predictive uncertainty when the profession anticipates the consequences of a
proposed rule.15 In Part V, I offer early examples of the bar’s failure to
subordinate the business interests of lawyers to the competing interests of
clients, the justice system, or both.16 I provide these as a prelude to the
debates in Part VI, whose subject is recent examples of a failure of
professional responsibility.17 Part VII cites screening lateral lawyers as an
example of one situation where the presumption in favor of the client’s
interest ahead of the interests of lawyers was properly rebutted.18 Part VIII
offers some ideas about how the bar can do a better job.19 Part IX
recommends a new committee whose role will be to anticipate the future and
thereby to enable the bar to be ready rather than reactive.20 I propose initial
agenda items for that committee.21
III. THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE BASIC
POSTULATES
What conventions or processes ought to govern how bar associations in
general, and the American Bar Association in particular, fashion the rules
they will propose to courts and lawmakers? Two facts are essential to
understanding the professional responsibility of the legal profession. First,
the profession as such does not have a client, nor does a bar association.22
So we need not concern ourselves with the specific ethics rules governing
the lawyer-client relationship or with agency or other law that presumes the
existence of a client as a lawyer’s principal. Second, bar associations assist
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part V.
17. See discussion infra Part VI.
18. See discussion infra Part VII.
19. See discussion infra Part VIII.
20. See discussion infra Part IX.
21. See discussion infra Part IX.
22. The mission statement of the ABA states that the only four goals of the organization are to
“serve our members; improve our profession; eliminate bias and enhance diversity; advance the rule
of law.”
Association Overview and Structure, AM. BAR ASS’N, at 1, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/2011_2012_greenbook_ch_12.authchec
kdam.pdf.
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in the development and adoption of the rules that an individual lawyer must
obey.23 Nowhere do bar associations actually have power to prescribe
professional conduct rules—courts, and, to a lesser extent, lawmakers, do
that.24 But the profession does influence the courts, which explains the
striking similarity between the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the ethics rules that courts in U.S. jurisdictions nationwide have
adopted.25 Courts deviate from the Model Rules but not by much.26 We
must ask what should guide the profession when it exercises this great
influence.
The legal profession is hard to pin down. It is big and shapeless.27 It
has shifting factions that can change membership depending on the issue.
The bar is rarely unanimous and often divided.28 What it proposes or
opposes is the distillation of an aggregation of views and therefore
compromise.29 The bar may support rules that many lawyers oppose, but
they will have lost the debate and the vote. Committees of a bar association
23. For example, a commission of the California State Bar has spent more than a decade
revising that state’s ethical rules, which will ultimately be presented to the state supreme court. See
Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, THE STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/committees/rulescommission.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). The New
York State Bar Association similarly reviewed that state’s ethics rules and proposed revisions to the
courts. See Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Proposed_New_York_Rules_of_
Professional_Conduct_Approved_Nov_3_2007&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1
5179; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. d (2000).
24. Courts often insist that either explicitly or implicitly, the judicial power includes the power
to regulate the bar and are more or less tolerant of legislation that purports to do the same. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. c (2000).
25. The ABA has compiled charts showing variations in the text of particular rules. See
generally Charts Comparing Individual Professional Conduct Model Rules as Adopted or Proposed
by States to ABA Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). While there are certainly
differences, the similarities, including the organization of the rules, are extensive. Id. I realize
lawyers are regulated in many ways other than through professional conduct rules. See generally
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). And some have
questioned whether judges should have the power to write the professional conduct rules. See, e.g.,
Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149 (2010). But my starting
point here is that judges do decide what the rules will be and that lawyers, especially through bar
associations, have significant influence in those judicial decisions.
26. See STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY SIMON & ANDREW PERLMAN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2012) (annotating variations among American jurisdictions).
27. According to the ABA, in 2011 there were 1,245,205 licensed American lawyers. Lawyer
Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf.
28. Perhaps the greatest state deviations appear in exceptions to confidentiality. See GILLERS ET
AL., supra note 26, at 82–89.
29. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 441–45 (2002)
(detailing the five-year process undertaken by the ABA Commission tasked with revising the Rules
of Professional Conduct in 2000 and stating that the Commission “engaged in regular
communication with its 250-member advisory council” and “received and considered literally
hundreds of comments on its work”).
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charged to recommend rules to their organization must take into
consideration which rules have a realistic chance of adoption. They may not
be what a majority of a committee’s members would support if the choice
were theirs alone. The art of making change in ethics rules is, like politics,
an art of the possible.30 To speak of the responsibility of the bar, then, is a
bit like speaking about the responsibility of “the community” or even
humankind. But unlike those esoteric discussions, which have gone on for
centuries and which do not demand or invite finality, rulemaking requires
closure, at least until a new rule emerges. At the end of any process to
revise a rule—and it is very much a process, sometimes lengthy, as I have
learned in my own bar work—a recommendation is made and the bar must
then accept responsibility for it and for the process that produced it. It is
fair, then, to look to the bar’s public positions and methodologies as a
measure of its fulfillment of its public responsibility.
The profession serves three constituencies when it asks courts to
approve professional conduct rules (and from here on I will focus mostly on
courts because legislation plays a lesser, though not irrelevant, role in my
discussion). First, clients as a group are a constituency, not a lawyer’s
individual clients. Lawyers who participate in rulemaking for the profession
should disclose when a decision may “materially benefit[]” a particular
client.31 The lawyer’s duty is to protect the “integrity” of the rulemaking,32
where the objective is to identify the ethical duties all lawyers owe all
clients—or all clients in a particular category—in a system governed by the
rule of law. Second, lawyers are themselves a constituency because lawyers
are the agent-intermediaries between clients and the rule of law and for that
reason the bar has a collective or institutional interest in the rules that govern
the bar. The content of those rules will affect how lawyers do their job.
However, the status of lawyers as a constituency requires a distinction.
They are a constituency only because of their agency status. The career and
economic interests of lawyers, individually or collectively, are not by
themselves deserving of concern with an exception discussed below.33 But
as the history I recount in Part V warns us, the bar has on occasion favored
its economic interests ahead of other interests.34 The third constituency is

30. I saw that in the work of the ABA’s Multijurisdictional Practice Commission and again in
my membership on the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20. See Gillers, supra note 1.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.4 (2009).
32. Id. R. 6.4 cmt. 1.
33. See infra Part VII.
34. See infra Part V.
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the justice system itself.35 The justice system broadly defined—or we could
say a society based on the rule of law—is in the picture in the form of its
institutions, particularly courts and other tribunals. The goals of the justice
system are difficult to catalogue, of course, as will be the means best able to
achieve them. The point is that for every proposed rule we must be
cognizant of the consequences to the goals embedded in the rule of law. At
the very least, one goal is to facilitate access to legal advice and therefore to
the rule of law.36
The interests of the three constituencies may clash, but when they do,
the following postulates should ordinarily determine the outcome. First, the
profession’s professional responsibility should require it to subordinate its
own interests and those of clients to those of the justice system, even when
the first two are aligned. This is not majority rule. The justice system and
rule of law should prevail against the other two. Of course, the overhanging
and difficult question will be to identify the interests of the justice system in
any particular circumstance. But unless the combined interests of clients or
lawyers is justice by definition, which I do not believe it is, the interests of
justice have to be identified and must prevail. Second, as between the
interests of lawyers and those of clients, the latter should presumptively
control, but the presumption should be rebuttable because, in some
circumstances, the threat to clients is minimal and the advantages to lawyers
(and indirectly to the rule of law) is substantial.37 The inquiry requires
disinterested consideration.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
PROBLEM OF PREDICTIVE UNCERTAINTY
Consider the rule defining a lawyer’s duty on discovering a client’s
fraud on a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is representing the
client.38 Perhaps the unaware lawyer has submitted a document she then
learns is fraudulent or learns that the client lied at a deposition or in trial
testimony. The client’s interest is obvious: don’t tell. As he sees it, the
lawyer’s confidentiality duty should be higher than any duty to the tribunal
or the adversary. The lawyer’s preference may be the same. The lawyer,
though angry at the client, may not relish giving the judge information that
can support an investigation and possible indictment of the client for perjury
or obstruction of justice. Also, lawyers may argue that the greater the
number of exceptions to confidentiality, the greater the likelihood that
clients will conceal information the lawyer needs to represent the client
35.
36.
37.
38.
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competently.39 On the other hand, the interests of the justice system may
require disclosure if that is the only way to avoid a verdict based on fraud.
Today, that is in fact the ABA rule,40 although not the rule everywhere,41 and
it has not always been the ABA rule.42
We can imagine the same sort of clash when the work is not before a
tribunal but in the negotiation of a transaction. However, the ABA rules do
not then require (but may permit) disclosure, although they may also require
the lawyer to withdraw.43 This resolution favors the client who would not
wish to have his fraud revealed. And it favors the lawyer who may prefer
not to disclose the fraud. But do these results honor the goals of the justice
system and the rule of law? If the client is able to consummate the fraud
following the lawyer’s mandated withdrawal,44 the opponent in the
transaction is a victim of injustice.45 So, too, indirectly, may be others. That
is not good for the rule of law, which should make it hard to defraud people.
On the other hand, perhaps requiring the lawyer to disclose the fraud is even
worse for the rule of law because it will discourage client candor, leaving an
uninformed lawyer unable to persuade the client to desist. If she succeeds in
doing so, no injustice occurs.
We can debate which resolution is best for the rule of law, but that’s not
my purpose. Rather, I ask whether the profession is able to prefer, and has
in fact preferred, the interests of lawyers and clients over the interests of the
justice system when it tries to identify the best resolutions of the issues. In
other words, has the profession equated the public interest with the narrower
interests of clients and lawyers?
Debates over the proper rule when a lawyer confronts fraud on a court
or fraud in a negotiation often entail conflicting empirical predictions. The
39. See Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . and Its
Exceptions . . . , 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1324 (2003).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2009).
41. See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007).
42. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (construing the
DR 7-102(B)(1)).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009). Rule 4.1 protects the client’s
confidential information if disclosure is “prohibited by Rule 1.6.” Id. But several of the exceptions
to confidentiality in Rule 1.6(b), particularly Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3), will permit disclosure of
many client frauds, thereby freeing the lawyer to disclose confidences to prevent frauds or prevent or
mitigate the harm from frauds in which the lawyer’s services have been employed. Id. R. 1.6(b).
When the permissive confidentiality exceptions in Rule 1.6 are superimposed on the mandatory
language in Rule 4.1, the result may be to require the lawyer to disclose confidential information to
avoid assisting in a crime or fraud or to withdraw.
44. Id. R. 1.2(d), 1.16(a)(1).
45. See Martyn, supra note 39, at 1339.
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argument against forced disclosure to prevent transactional fraud or fraud on
a tribunal has the same objective as the contrary argument, namely to
prevent the fraud or limit its harm. The goals are the same. The argument
against mandatory disclosure (or even in favor of mandatory non-disclosure)
predicts, however, that this goal will more often be successful if the lawyer
is not obligated to disclose (or is obligated not to disclose). That prediction
is based on a view of human behavior. It makes certain assumptions that it
does not test. But a contrary behavioral assumption is also possible, namely
that fraudsters are not going to confide their fraud to their lawyers regardless
of what the confidentiality rule’s exceptions may forbid, require, or allow, so
lawyers will not have a chance to persuade them to stop. And when lawyers
do learn of client fraud, they often do so not from the client but from their
own investigations. Or, if from their client, it is because the client has
slipped up. If this contrary empirical assumption is more often than not
correct, then the argument against a mandatory disclosure rule (or in favor of
a mandatory non-disclosure rule) based on a prediction about client behavior
is weakened, perhaps fatally. But how do we know?
A lawyer’s prediction of harmful consequences if a court rules one way
or another may be effective when lawyers act as advocates. It is certainly
common. But when lawyers exercise their quasi-public powers in urging
courts to adopt one version of a rule rather than another, they are not acting
as advocates. We should then view the courts as akin to clients. Lawyers
have a duty to provide clients with accurate information so they can
intelligently answer the questions that are within their authority.46 That duty
includes identifying and evaluating predictive uncertainty when it exists, as
it often will.47 The bar should have this duty to the courts, too. In meeting
that public responsibility, lawyers are, in the purest sense, officers or friends
of the court. For the two examples in this Part—fraud on a tribunal and
fraud on a person—the predictive uncertainty may appear insoluble. I
suppose it is if we mean to say that we cannot know the answers with
certainty. But there may be a way to increase confidence. American
jurisdictions have strikingly different exceptions to their confidentiality
rules. On a spectrum, California’s rules are the most protective of
confidentiality, with only one explicit (and permissive) exception.48 New
Jersey, by contrast, has many exceptions, some of them mandatory.49 So one
would suppose that an inquiry into the experience of lawyers in these states,
and others along the spectrum from least to most protective of client
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).
47. See Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin, & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Neb. 1999)
(discussing the duty to inform client in assessing a settlement offer when “issue is uncertain,
unsettled or debatable”).
48. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2012) (stating that the lawyer may disclose
criminal act “likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm”).
49. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1984).
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confidences, could produce useful information to test our predictions. The
answers can be used along with other information in helping to identify the
rule that best serves the system of justice and the goal of preventing fraud.
So far as I know, no one has attempted this investigation, but that has not
stopped the predictions. I will argue that when the profession makes
arguments based on prediction, it should be candid about the basis for the
prediction, and, where possible, have evidence supporting the prediction or
else acknowledge that it does not have this evidence and justify its absence.50
V. EARLY EXAMPLES WHERE THE BAR’S INTERESTS PREVAILED OVER
THOSE OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM OR CLIENTS
Money, as might be expected, can lead lawyers astray much as it can
anyone else. Rules and court rulings that threaten to increase competition or
reduce lawyers’ incomes are a prime target of the bar’s opposition as shown
in the examples below.51 Of course, financial reward is rarely, if ever, cited
as the reason to oppose a rule. A proxy must be found, based in the interests
of clients or the true ends of justice. But the profit motive may not be far
from the surface or even at it. Three early examples of this behavior are the
fierce resistance to efforts of union members to use group purchasing power
to lower legal fees;52 support of minimum fee schedules;53 and the persistent
opposition to lawyer advertising even after the Supreme Court brought it
within the protection of the First Amendment’s commercial speech
doctrine.54 In a fourth example, the issue was a lawyer’s duty to an
organizational client.55 Money was not directly implicated there, but job
security and business expectations were.
A. The Union Cases
Although, as these things are measured, the three union cases are today
ancient history, still, we should never forget them.56 They reveal how easy it
was to disguise opposition to an innovation by citing protection of clients,

50. See infra Part VIII.B.
51. See infra Parts V.A–D.
52. See infra Part V.A.
53. See infra Part V.B.
54. See infra Part V.C.
55. See infra Part V.D.
56. The cases are: United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United
Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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when, in fact, the union efforts in these cases promised substantial benefits
for clients at the expense of the private bar, and the need for protection was
conjectural. A better reason to remember the union cases, I suggest, is
because the impulse they displayed has not gone away and never will. The
bar is and always will be capable of behaving the same way. Nothing
surprising there. After all, the bar is composed of lawyers, and lawyers, like
people everywhere, are not without self-interest—although, again like
people everywhere, they may protest that their motives are altruistic. Nor is
such a claim necessarily an act of conscious deception, a purposeful strategy
of using public interest or client interest to mask selfish motives. I assume
that most often it is not. People can persuade themselves easily enough that
their goals are selfless.57
Unions attempted to use the group purchasing power of their members
to lower legal fees and otherwise protect workers injured on the job. They
did this either by negotiating lower fees with designated lawyers,58 to whom
members would then be referred, or by putting a salaried lawyer on staff to
represent union members,59 much like companies that reduce legal fees to
outside law firms by hiring lawyers to work as employees. No injured
worker was required to use the designated or staff lawyers.60 But of course it
could be much cheaper (or free) to do so, and each time one did other
lawyers lost a client. So the stakes were high and threatened to be higher if
the idea spread. The three union cases reached the Supreme Court between
1964 and 1971.61 The American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in the
first of the cases, urging the Court to uphold the challenge to the union’s
plan.62 It argued that the plan, by which the union negotiated reduced fees
with designated lawyers, amounted to the unauthorized practice of law and
that the lawyers who participated in it were acting unethically.63 After the
first of the cases was decided in favor of the union, the ABA persisted.
Joined by forty-eight state and local bar associations, it asked the Court to
rehear the case.64 Justice Black wrote all three opinions rejecting the
challenges. His language in the last of the cases displays his incredulity at
57. See W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C.
L. REV. 557, 570 (2001) (“[I]t is not hard to convince oneself that one’s primary motivation is not to
make money and so to imagine that one is acting professionally . . . .”).
58. See United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 577–78, 584. In the first of the cases, Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2, the union’s referrals to particular lawyers reflected a desire to ensure
competent representation.
59. See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 218–21.
60. See, e.g., United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 477 (explaining that the union “recommended”
lawyers to its members); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8 (same).
61. See supra note 56.
62. Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (No. 34), 1963 WL 105695.
63. Id. at 6–8.
64. Id.
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and exasperation with these efforts. Here are the strongly worded first and
last paragraphs of that opinion, which seem to have put an end to such
challenges:
The Michigan State Bar brought this action in January 1959 to
enjoin the members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from
engaging in activities undertaken for the stated purpose of assisting
their fellow workers, their widows and families, to protect
themselves from excessive fees at the hands of incompetent
attorneys in suits for damages under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act. The complaint charged, as factors relevant to the
cause of action, that the Union recommended selected attorneys to
its members and their families, that it secured a commitment from
those attorneys that the maximum fee charged would not exceed
25% of the recovery, and that it recommended Chicago lawyers to
represent Michigan claimants. The State Bar’s complaint appears
to be a plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees . . . .65
In the context of this case we deal with a cooperative union of
workers seeking to assist its members in effectively asserting claims
under the FELA. But the principle here involved cannot be limited
to the facts of this case. At issue is the basic right to group legal
action, a right first asserted in this Court by an association of
Negroes seeking the protection of freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution. The common thread running through our decisions in
NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of
enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation.
That was the holding in United Mine Workers, Trainmen, and
NAACP v. Button. The injunction in the present case cannot stand
in the face of these prior decisions.66
The challengers in the union cases did not, of course, argue for “court
protection of unlimited legal fees.” As framed in Justice Harlan’s dissent in
United Mine Workers, the challengers argued that if the union could appear

65.
66.

401 U.S. at 577–78 (emphasis added).
Id. at 585–86 (emphasis added).
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as an intermediary between the worker and lawyers, apparently in any
capacity, the state could anticipate that the lawyers might then disserve a
worker when it benefitted the union to do so.67 In fact, the word “might”
appears several times in Justice Harlan’s dissent in United Mine Workers.68
Of course, disloyalty is always a risk when lawyers feel allegiance to other
interests, including their own.69 This is the danger that the conflict rules aim
to reduce,70 but it can never be entirely eliminated. In other situations, when
advantageous to the income of the bar, we tolerate risk or we permit clients
to consent to the presence of risk, although a client’s consent to risk does not
authorize her lawyer to succumb to it.71
B. Minimum Fee Schedules
To get a mortgage when they bought a Virginia home, the Goldfarbs
needed a lawyer to perform a title search.72 The first lawyer they talked to
told them that it was his policy to keep his charges in line with the
[State Bar’s] minimum-fee schedule which provided for a fee of 1%
of the value of the property involved [for the work the Goldfarbs
needed]. Petitioners then tried to find a lawyer who would examine
the title for less than the fee fixed by the schedule. They sent letters
to 36 other Fairfax County lawyers requesting their fees. Nineteen
replied, and none indicated that he would charge less than the rate
fixed by the schedule; several stated that they knew of no attorney
who would do so.73
A lawyer could be disciplined for ignoring the minimum fee schedule.74
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the schedule violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act.75 It rejected the bar’s claim that a “learned profession” was
not subject to the Act’s prohibition on anticompetitive conduct because it
was not in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of the Act.76 “In
67. 389 U.S. at 230–32 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
68. Id. at 228–32 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked about Ethics: A Critical View
of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 251 (1985) (discussing what constitutes disloyalty on the
part of a lawyer).
70. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009) (general rule on concurrent
conflicts of interest).
71. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(f) (containing restrictions to ensure that a person paying a lawyer’s fee to
represent another person will not subvert the lawyer’s duty to the client).
72. Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776 (1975).
73. Id. at 776.
74. Id. at 781 (“The fee schedule was enforced through the prospect of professional discipline
from the State Bar, and the desire of attorneys to comply with announced professional norm . . . .”).
75. Id. at 793.
76. Id. at 786.
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arguing that learned professions are not ‘trade or commerce,’” the Court
wrote that “the County Bar seeks a total exclusion from antitrust regulation.
Whether state regulation is active or dormant, real or theoretical, lawyers
would be able to adopt anticompetitive practices with impunity. We cannot
find support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping
exclusion.”77 And in a footnote, the Court recognized what would have been
clear to many, namely that “[t]he reason for adopting the fee schedule does
not appear to have been wholly altruistic. The first sentence in respondent
State Bar’s 1962 Minimum Fee Schedule Report states: ‘The lawyers have
slowly, but surely, been committing economic suicide as a profession.’”78
The ABA, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the State Bar of
Texas, the State Bar of Wisconsin, and the Bar Association of San
Francisco, among others, filed amicus briefs supporting the Virginia Bar, at
least in part.79 The ABA brief equivocated. It said that the Association did
not support schedules that “fix fees,” but had supported fee schedules “in
certain contexts.”80 There were apparently good fee schedules and bad ones.
The brief proposed a test that courts could use to distinguish between the
two.81 It did not apply its test to the Virginia schedule and so took no
explicit position on how the Court should rule.82
Why didn’t the ABA and other bar groups support the Goldfarbs?
Aside from enhancing the income of lawyers—a goal no one endorsed as
legitimate—what is the value of minimum fee schedules, which the ABA
was prepared to accept as appropriate in some (ill-defined) circumstances
although not categorically? The closest to a seemingly neutral defense of
minimum fee schedules might go this way: without minimum fee schedules,
lawyers will compete on price and consumers will choose the cheapest
lawyer, which is not an advisable way to choose a lawyer. Clients had to be
protected from themselves. Further, as fees declined in the wake of price
competition, lawyers would have to take on more clients to earn a living.
Time, which is what lawyers sell, is finite. The result would be less time for
each matter and a heightened risk of poor work. A minimum fee schedule
encourages competent representation. It cannot do that by itself, of course.
77. Id. at 787.
78. Id. at 786 n.16.
79. See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
80. Id. at 18.
81. “In assessing their [fee schedules] legality, the Court should determine whether the
justifications for the particular schedules at issue constitute legitimate objectives of professional
regulation.” Id.
82. Id.
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Nor will every low cost lawyer be incompetent. It is a matter of
probabilities. The probability of competent work increases if lawyers are
adequately compensated and can spend as much time on a matter as it
demands.
Or, to put this argument bluntly and less neutrally, a lawyer’s duty of
competent representation is insufficient by itself to ensure competent
representation. Lawyers have to be paid a minimum amount to encourage
them to do competent work. Left to the market, lawyers will follow the cash
even if it means they will not be able to do a good job. Not that any lawyer
would choose such an outcome, but that is what will happen often enough,
despite their best intentions. As a result, clients will be hurt. In short, the
profession needs minimum fee schedules not to enrich lawyers but to protect
clients. This defense would likely be seen as a slur on the profession’s
character if uttered from outside the bar. Yet, implicitly at least, this is the
claim lawyers themselves were making.
In addition to the money angle in the union cases and in Goldfarb,
another fact must be underscored. Changes to the way lawyers could do
business that would reduce legal costs were not the product of a suddenly
enlightened profession that set aside its self-interest. The courts forced the
changes and the bar had to comply. Change came from outside. Goldfarb’s
holding was categorical—it ended all minimum fee schedules imposed by
bar associations. But the union cases could be contained, and that was the
bar’s response: seek to limit the reach of the rulings. The ABA did not try to
find new ways to organize the market for legal services—that is, to adopt
rules that would afford potential clients who were not members of unions the
ability to use combined purchasing power to keep fees low. Rather, it made
any such effort burdensome. In 1969, after the second of the three union
cases, the ABA amended DR 2-103(D) of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility to allow lawyers to work with lay intermediaries “only in
those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation
at the time of the rendition of the services requires the allowance of such
legal service activities.”83 This restriction was eased somewhat in 1975.84

83. Thomas Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold
Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 589 (emphasis added) (citing 94 REPS. OF THE
A.B.A. 390 (1969)).
84. Id at 590. As amended, DR 2-103(D)(4) contained other restrictions on a lawyer’s ability to
accept matters from an “organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal services to its
members or beneficiaries,” including a requirement that the organization pay for counsel outside its
plan and a detailed filing requirement:
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services furnished or paid for
by the organization may, if such member or beneficiary so desires, select counsel other
than that furnished, selected or approved by the organization for the particular matter
involved; and the legal service plan of such organization provides appropriate relief for
any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished,
selected or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the circumstances
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C. Lawyer Advertising
Two years after Goldfarb, Bates v. Arizona State Bar85 addressed the
broad national prohibition on lawyer advertising. The ABA as amicus
argued that the First Amendment did not even protect the bare bones
advertisement before the Court.86 The brief said:
The prevention of misleading, confusing or non-informative
announcements is not, however, the only concern of the States.
Certain forms of information dissemination concerning legal
services may affect the quality and nature of those services, may
compromise the independence of an attorney, may draw into
question the integrity of the judicial process, may encourage the
bringing of litigation for improper motives, and may have other
adverse consequences for the judicial system.87
But the Association (and local bar groups88) landed on the wrong side of
history once more. The Court granted commercial speech protection to
lawyer advertising.89 Yet again, change was forced upon the bar from
outside. Lawyer advertising also threatens lawyers’ income, but not the
income of all lawyers. Lawyers with established practices, who depended
on and had reason to expect repeat business and referrals from other lawyers
and former clients, were more likely to view legal advertising as a particular
threat because they did not need it.90 But other, perhaps less established,
lawyers could now make their availability known to current and potential

of the matter involved and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such
relief . . . .
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority at least
annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its
schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, and financial
results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not know
or have cause to know of such failure.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(4) (1985).
85. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
86. The stripped down (I’m tempted to say “pathetic”) legal advertisement that spawned the
revolution in lawyer advertising is in an appendix to the opinion. Id. at 385.
87. Amicus Brief of the American Bar Association Supporting Appellee, Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (No.76-316), 1976 WL 178671, at *2.
88. The Westlaw report of the case shows amicus briefs supporting Arizona from bar
associations in, among other jurisdictions: Iowa, New York, North Carolina, Maryland, Texas, and
Virginia.
89. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
90. See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public
Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 335 (1996).
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clients directly.91 So could lawyers whose business model relied on volume
and for whom volume permitted lower fees.92 As lawyers became more
sophisticated in the efficient and effective use of marketing, such threats
would predictably grow. In addition, Bates, coming after Goldfarb, meant
that lawyers could advertise their competitive fees for routine services as
well as their hourly rates.93 Indeed, the content of the advertisement in Bates
was merely a list of routine services and prices.94
The potential breadth of Bates’s protection was destined to be the
subject of intra-professional squabbles in one of two ways. First, courts
adopted rules meant to put as much of the advertising genie back in the
bottle as the Supreme Court might permit.95 Lawyers wishing to advertise
opposed these efforts, citing their commercial speech rights.96 Second,
disciplinary bodies that targeted lawyers for improper advertisements faced
First Amendment defenses.97 The outcomes of these cases were decidedly
one-sided. The lawyers who relied on Bates to challenge restrictive rules
won every Supreme Court contest in the ensuing eighteen years,98 except for
two narrow decisions of limited scope.99
D. Lawyers for Organizations
Although the subject of Rule 1.13 is lawyers working for
organizations,100 corporations are much the dominant organization. When a
lawyer represents a company, she necessarily takes her instructions from its

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Bates, 433 U.S. at 367–68, 384–85.
94. These included uncontested divorce, individual bankruptcy, name change, and adoption. Id.
at 385.
95. That effort has continued three decades later. See, e.g., Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79 (2d
Cir. 2010) (finding many of the provisions of New York’s rules on law advertising unconstitutional).
96. See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that the State could not
categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business by truthful and nondeceptive mail sent
to persons known to need legal representation); Alexander, 598 F.3d 79.
97. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(invalidating state rule that restricted the content of newspaper advertisements aimed at persons with
specific legal claims).
98. See, e.g., Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(holding the attorney had a First Amendment right, under standards applicable to commercial
speech, to advertise certification as trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy);
Shapero, 486 U.S. 466; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding Missouri regulation of lawyer
advertising unconstitutional).
99. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding Florida rule forbidding mail
solicitation of accident victims or their survivors for thirty days after the accident); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state rule forbidding in person solicitation of
automobile accident victims).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSILITY R. 1.13(a) (2009).
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officers, who are not her client.101 Yet the officers decide the terms of
employment for in-house lawyers, including salary, benefits, and
assignments. Outside lawyers look to corporate officers for retentions. A
dilemma arises if a company’s lawyers discover that officers, perhaps top
officers, perhaps those with whom they work, are either causing the
organization to act unlawfully toward others or violating their legal duties to
the organization for personal gain. Since the officers are not the lawyers’
clients, we would expect lawyers to take steps to protect the company, which
has no legitimate interest in violating the law or in becoming the victim of
management illegality.102 But lawyers will be reluctant to antagonize
corporate officers because their jobs, assignments, or retentions depend on
their good will.103 Yet their duty is to protect their client.
As originally adopted, Model Rule 1.13 contained a reporting up
requirement and no reporting out requirement.104 Reporting up means that
the lawyer may or must appeal to persons higher and higher in the company
in an effort to protect the company from substantial harm. Reporting out
means that the lawyer may or must reveal the situation to persons outside the
organization if reporting up is unsuccessful. Rule 1.13’s reporting up
language, adopted in 1983, originally imposed what may be called a “soft”
duty to report up and even that duty arose only if the lawyer “knows” of the
offending act and the act is “in a matter related to the representation.”105 By
definition, then, a tax lawyer who knows of illegal conduct that could lead to
great financial harm to the client, but which is unrelated to her tax work,
would not be within the mandate. Further, the reporting up duty merely
required the lawyer to proceed “as is reasonably necessary in the best
interests of the organization.”106 The rule offered several options, including,
“if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization.”107 If the highest
authority did not remedy the situation, “the lawyer [could] resign in
accordance with Rule 1.16.”108

101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.13(a) (2009).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 171–72. See also Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c)
Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
289 (1987).
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.13(b), (f) (1983).
106. Id. R.1.13(b).
107. See id.
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.13(c) (1983).
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This resolution remained unchanged until 2002, when Congress passed
what has come to be known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (or SOX
informally).109 Sarbanes-Oxley was the most significant federal legislative
response to the corporate scandals in the United States, beginning with the
collapse of Enron, followed by the indictment, conviction (later reversed),
and eventual demise of Arthur Andersen,110 and unlawful conduct at Tyco,
WorldCom, and elsewhere.111 Section 307 of the Act, which required the
SEC to adopt a reporting up rule, provided:
Not later than 180 days after July 30, 2002, the Commission shall
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors,
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any
way in the representation of issuers, including a rule —
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by
the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the
chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof);
and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or
sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to
report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors
of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by
the issuer, or to the board of directors.112
Beyond the mandated reporting up rules, Congress gave the agency
authority to adopt other rules governing lawyers who appear or practice
before it, including a reporting out rule.113
Now, once again, events extraneous to the bar were forcing it to
reconsider its professional conduct rules. In anticipation of congressional
action following the corporate scandals, the ABA created a Task Force on

109. 15 U.S.C §§ 7201–66 (2006).
110. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
111. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §1.6-12(f)(1).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
113. The language quoted in the text mandates only the rules identified in paragraphs (1) and (2),
but the authority to issue rules governing “attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission” was not so limited. Id. See generally Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan
P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 786–
87 (2004).
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Corporate Responsibility in March 2002.114 If the ABA and then state courts
modified their own rules of professional conduct in a way the SEC
approved, the bar could hope that the agency would take a minimalist
approach to the authority Congress gave it, doing little or no more than SOX
required. Indeed, the Task Force’s recommendations to amend Rule 1.13,
which the House of Delegates accepted in August 2003, most likely explain
the SEC’s forbearance from adopting a mandatory reporting out rule.115
The amendments to Rule 1.13 are significant but not entirely satisfying.
First, they strengthen the reporting up obligation.116 Although reporting up
is not obligatory, it is now presumptively required “[u]nless the lawyer
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so.”117 Previously, reporting up was simply one option
available to the lawyer.118 Of greater consequence, Rule 1.13 now contains
its own exception to confidentiality.119 It permits, but does not require,
reporting out if, after reporting up, “the highest authority . . . insists upon or
fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to
act, that is clearly a violation of law,” and if, in addition, “the lawyer
reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization.”120 However, Rule 1.13 still requires
that the lawyer “know[]” of the conduct and that the conduct be in a “matter
related to the representation.”121 The patent lawyer who happens to learn
about a financial fraud is likely to be exempt from the rule.
VI. RECENT EXAMPLES THAT QUESTION THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The pattern described in Part V has continued into and past the first
decade of the current century. I will use three examples. They are the
quality of the arguments advanced in rejecting support for a model
collaborative law statute or court rule;122 the successful effort to prevent
study and discussion of a rule that would allow non-lawyers to have even

114. Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 2002), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/poladv/letters/107th/business062002/roster.pdf.
115. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 172–73.
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2009).
117. Id.
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(b) (1983).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2009).
120. Id.
121. Id. R. 1.13(b).
122. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
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limited equity interests in for-profit law firms and the accompanying
unsuccessful effort to prevent study and discussion of rules that would
permit limited fee sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers;123 and rejection
of a writing requirement for fee agreements.124 In each instance, I suggest,
the ABA (or constituents) have failed to measure up to the high standards
that should govern the behavior of lawyers when they engage in the quasipublic task of rulemaking for the legal profession.
A. Collaborative Law
What is collaborative law? The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (“National Conference”) uses this definition:
Collaborative law is a voluntary, contractually based alternative
dispute resolution process for parties who seek to negotiate a
resolution of their matter rather than having a ruling imposed upon
them by a court or arbitrator.
The distinctive feature of
collaborative law, as compared to other forms of alternative dispute
resolution such as mediation, is that parties are represented by
lawyers
(“collaborative
lawyers”)
during
negotiations.
Collaborative lawyers do not represent the party in court, but only
for the purpose of negotiating agreements. The parties agree in
advance that their lawyers are disqualified from further representing
parties by appearing before a tribunal if the collaborative law
process ends without complete agreement (“disqualification
requirement”). (citation omitted) Parties thus retain collaborative
lawyers for the limited purpose of acting as advocates and
counselors during the negotiation process.125
Professor Ted Schneyer further explains:
[Collaborative Law’s] most novel—and controversial—feature is
the “four-way” agreement that divorcing spouses and their lawyers
sign at the outset, thereby committing themselves to collaborate in a
good-faith effort to reach a marital dissolution agreement without
resort to litigation. To motivate all four participants to put the
prospect of litigation aside and focus on reaching an agreement, a
“disqualification” provision limits the scope of the lawyers’
engagements. Each lawyer not only agrees with her client, but also
123. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
124. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
125. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, at Prefatory Note,
1 (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collaborative_law/uclranducla_
finalact_jul10.pdf [hereinafter UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES].
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promises the other spouse, that the lawyer’s engagement will end if
negotiations fail and litigation is necessary. Should either spouse
choose to end the process and litigate, both will have to retain new
counsel or litigate pro se, and neither collaborative lawyer will earn
any additional fees in the matter. Thus, each spouse has the power
to terminate the other spouse’s lawyer-client relationship by ending
the process.126
While variations are possible, collaborative law’s essential feature is an
enforceable promise that each party’s lawyer will not represent him or her in
the event that the collaborative effort fails and the matter goes to court.127
This promise, in the view of collaborative law practitioners, facilitates
informal resolution.128 In the four-way agreement, each lawyer makes a
promise to the other spouse.129 The debate over the ethics of collaborative
law has focused on whether a lawyer making the non-representation promise
to the opposing spouse will have a non-consentable conflict of interest
between her duty to the opposing spouse and her duty to her client.130 One
bar association has rejected the four-way agreement on that ground,131 but
others, including the ABA’s ethics committee, have approved it, citing the
rule that allows lawyers to limit the scope of their representation, so long as
the clients have given their informed consent.132
Collaborative law has achieved prominence, especially as an alternative
to litigation in divorce.133 However, nothing about the collaborative model
limits it to matrimonial matters. A few state legislatures and courts have
adopted laws or rules regulating and facilitating collaborative law.134 In

126. Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2008).
127. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at R. 9 cmt. (“The disqualification
requirement for collaborative lawyers after collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining
characteristic of collaborative law.”).
128. Schneyer, supra note 126, at 290.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 314.
131. Colorado Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007), available at
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/10159/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-115:-EthicalConsiderations-in-the-Collaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24/.
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447 (2007). For links to
state opinions, see UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 15.
133. See generally UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 1–16;
Schneyer, supra note 126, at 289–94 (discussing the increased use of collaborative law in divorce
cases).
134. Fact Sheet on the Uniform Collaborative Law Rules/Act, A.B.A. SEC. DISP. RESOL.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act (last visited Oct. 24,
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short, it is a big deal, and, while it is not for everyone, its supporters argue
that it has lowered the acrimony and the emotional and financial cost of
family dissolution.135 It offers the possibility of a different model for access
to the rule of law, cheaper and with less recrimination.136 While there will be
disagreements over the details of how the process should work, the concept
itself should be one the bar would wish to study and perhaps improve and
promote.137
In 2009, the National Conference produced a Uniform Collaborative
Law Act, accompanied by a detailed report that described the history of
collaborative law, reviewed scholarship about it, and provided a section by
section analysis of the act’s provisions.138 Although in the form of proposed
legislation, the Conference wrote that the text of the act could also be put in
the form of a court rule.139 In 2011, the ABA House of Delegates was
presented with a resolution to “approve[] . . . the Uniform Collaborative Law
Rules/Act . . . as appropriate legislation or rules for those states desiring to
adopt the specific substantive law suggested therein.”140 In other words, if a
state were interested in legislation or a court rule addressing collaborative
law, the ABA would be commending the National Conference’s model as an
“appropriate” way to do so.
Yet the House of Delegates overwhelmingly rejected the resolution.
The vote was 298-154.141 How could this be? What arguments did the
speakers make to justify opposition to an idea that had become popular with
so many and was the product of careful study and experience?
In advance of the debate, the Chair of the ABA House of Delegates
recounted the relationship between the National Conference and the ABA.142
The House takes an up or down vote, either approving the model act as
2012).
135. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES , supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 9–10.
136. See Schneyer, supra note 126, at 293–94.
137. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at Prefatory Note, 20–21.
138. Id.
139. Rachel Zahorsky, ABA Rejects Proposed Measure for Collaborative Law Guidelines, A.B.A.
J. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_aba_house_of_delegates_rejected_
resolution_110b/.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails (Part
1), A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110b-oncollaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-1/ [hereinafter Part 1]. The
debate over the Collaborative Law Act was video recorded and placed on the ABA website.
References here to arguments in the debate come from the recording, which can be found in three
parts. Id.; Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails
(Part 2), A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110bon-collaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-2/ [hereinafter Part 2];
Resolution 110B on Collaborative Law Sparks Vigorous Debate but Ultimately Fails (Part 3),
A.B.A. NOW (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/resolution-110b-oncollaborative-law-sparks-%20vigorous-debate-but-ultimately-fails-part-3/ [hereinafter Part 3].
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“appropriate” for states desiring to adopt such a law or disapproving it.143
The House cannot amend a model act, but approval of a model act does not
make its content ABA policy, which apparently means that the Association
would not, through a yes vote, bind itself to the exact provisions of the act.144
It would be perfectly fitting to reject the resolution if the House believed
that the model act was inappropriate, perhaps because of drafting problems.
But the debate did not focus on such problems. Rather, speakers voiced
three dubious objections to the very idea of collaborative law, sometimes
repeating each other:
• The Model Act envisions legislative control of the bar. But “one of
the really essential tenets for this Association has been to preserve
the ABA as a self-regulating profession. . . . [The Act] is the
proverbial camel’s nose under the tent of self-regulation by
supporting a draft law that permits legislators to regulate.”145
• The Model Act enables “either side [to] disqualify the lawyer on the
other side at any time for a good reason, for no reason, or for a bad
reason.” This was said to be “so antithetical to the obligations of
lawyers . . . so antithetical to the proposition that a client at the
beginning of a representation could ever give informed consent to
such a procedure, that there is no basis on which we should approve
it.”146
• The Model Act hurts “very vulnerable people,”147 and especially
women because “the stronger of the clients can displace the lawyer
of the weak and, as a result, we would be endorsing a procedure that
restores disadvantage to clients [and] in many of the instances
alluded to here that’s going to be a women’s issue.”148
Let us consider these claims in order.
Legislative control of the bar. This objection does not address the
wisdom of collaborative law, or the substance of the Model Act, but rather
who should adopt a collaborative law scheme—courts or legislatures. Now
maybe we would get a better document from the courts than we would from
lawmakers. But the claim that the ABA should oppose legislation that
regulates lawyers because of resistance to legislative control relies on two
myths the profession embraces, at least when convenient. The first is the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Part 2, supra note 142.
Id.
Id. at 0:30 and 1:54.
Part 1, supra note 142, at 14:22.
Part 2, supra note 142, at 11:16.
Id. at 18:23.
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Myth of Judicial Control of the Bar. The second, tied to the first, is the
Myth of Lawyer Self-Regulation. Both myths surfaced in the collaborative
law debate. Anxiety about legislation anticipates that if lawmakers can
regulate the behavior of lawyers, judicial power over the bar will erode.
And then the profession’s self-regulation will suffer because the political
branches will be less deferential to the bar’s positions, and its role in the rule
of law, than are the courts, which are staffed, of course, with former lawyers.
I do not say that there is no risk in giving legislatures power over the bar—a
power that, depending on its nature, lawmakers may exercise for political
motives unrelated, or even harmful, to the fair administration of justice. But
I do say that lawmakers nationwide now share with courts power to make
rules governing the conduct of lawyers. Legislation governing lawyers is
legion.149
We should be wary of arguments based on the source of a regulation
because they can be invoked selectively to disguise opposition to substance.
An innovation should be assessed on its merits, which may include the
source, but the source should not be categorically dispositive. Even where
opposition to the source is justified, if the idea has merit, it should be
pursued through other channels. Nor does legislative power exclude
opportunity for lawyers to influence the laws that legislators adopt. Lawyers
can lobby lawmakers just as they lobby judges (although they do not then
use the word “lobby”). The complexity and length of some regulations,
furthermore, may make them inappropriate for a court rule. At the very
same meeting at which opponents of collaborative law warned against the
dangers of legislative control, the House approved “A Model Act Governing
the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Proceedings.”150 This Act was written and supported by ABA entities.151 A
lengthy provision details the duties, to be legislatively imposed, that lawyers
owe minor clients.152 There is nothing remarkable in this description. The

149. A list of citations might consume this entire volume. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474
(McKinney 2012) (“Compensation of attorney or counselor”); § 474-a (“Contingent fees for
attorneys in claims in actions for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice”); § 476-a (“Action for
unlawful practice of law”) (in part defining “unlawful practice of the law”); § 491 (“Sharing of
compensation by attorneys prohibited”); § 493 (“Attorneys forbidden to defend criminal
prosecutions carried on by their partners, or formerly by themselves”); and § 495 (“Corporations and
voluntary associations not to practice law”). See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 2012)
(“Duties of attorney”); § 6147 (governing contingency fee agreements); § 6148 (covering noncontingency fee agreements); and §§ 6157–59.2 (detailed rules on legal advertising). In addition,
legislation in many places is the source of the attorney-client privilege, which goes to the essence of
the bar’s identity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West 2012).
150. Report to the House of Delegates, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIGATION (2011),
available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1350503066101a.pdf.
151. Id. at 1 (listing the fourteen entities supporting the Act).
152. Section 7 of the Act provides:
(b) The duties of a child’s lawyer include, but are not limited to:
(1) taking all steps reasonably necessary to represent the client in the proceeding,
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complexity of the Act made it more amenable to legislation than to court
rule. What is remarkable, however, is that the House approved ABAinspired legislation imposing duties on lawyers at the same time that it was
urged to (and did) reject other legislation because it imposed duties on
lawyers.153
The disqualification issue. The objection that collaborative law enables
“either side [to] disqualify the lawyer on the other side at any time for a
good reason, for no reason or for a bad reason”154 is not even an argument. It
is merely a description of the premises of collaborative law, though
provocatively stated.
It says nothing about why this result is
objectionable.155
As stated, lawyers may sign the collaborative agreement along with their
including but not limited to: interviewing and counseling the client, preparing a case
theory and strategy, preparing for and participating in negotiations and hearings,
drafting and submitting motions, memoranda and orders, and such other steps as
established by the applicable standards of practice for lawyers acting on behalf of
children in this jurisdiction;
(2) reviewing and accepting or declining, after consultation with the client, any
proposed stipulation for an order affecting the child and explaining to the court the
basis for any opposition;
(3) taking action the lawyer considers appropriate to expedite the proceeding and
the resolution of contested issues;
(4) where appropriate, after consultation with the client, discussing the possibility of
settlement or the use of alternative forms of dispute resolution and participating in
such processes to the extent permitted under the law of this state;
(5) meeting with the child prior to each hearing and for at least one in-person
meeting every quarter;
(6) where appropriate and consistent with both confidentiality and the child's legal
interests, consulting with the best interests advocate;
(7) prior to every hearing, investigating and taking necessary legal action regarding
the child’s medical, mental health, social, education, and overall well-being;
(8) visiting the home, residence, or any prospective residence of the child, including
each time the placement is changed;
(9) seeking court orders or taking any other necessary steps in accordance with the
child’s direction to ensure that the child’s health, mental health, educational,
developmental, cultural and placement needs are met; and
(10) representing the child in all proceedings affecting the issues before the court,
including hearings on appeal or referring the child’s case to the appropriate
appellate counsel as provided for by/ mandated by [inset local rule/law etc].
ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS § 7(b), available at id. at 6–7 (footnote omitted).
153. Executive Summaries, AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/2011_hod_annual_
meeting_executive_summaries_index.authcheckdam.pdf.
154. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
155. Furthermore, the statement ignores the fact that a very good reason may motivate the parties
to give their opponents the ability to disqualify their lawyer, namely the wish to conclude a dispute
without the expense and anxiety of litigation.
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clients or the clients alone may sign, promising each other not to use the
same lawyer in the event of litigation. Either way, the client is giving up a
right to counsel of choice in exchange for something else. A lawyer would,
of course, have to explain all of this to the client, whatever the form of the
non-representation promise, laying out the advantages and disadvantages
and advising on the wisdom of the agreement under the circumstances. If a
non-representation promise is deemed a non-waivable conflict only if
lawyers make the promise along with the clients—which is the assumption
behind the Colorado opinion,156 but rejected elsewhere—then clients can
circumvent the impediment of non-waivability through client-client
agreements, assuming courts will enforce them.157 If they will not, then a
fortiori they will not enforce a four-way agreement either. If a nonrepresentation agreement is ethically impermissible under all circumstances,
it spells the death of collaborative law as its proponents envision it because
collaborative law is premised on assurances to clients that the adverse
lawyer will not later oppose them in court.
I realize that arguments to the House of Delegates are subject to time
constraints. But even so, I don’t see how an objection based on the ability of
an opposing client to disqualify counsel can be defended even if opponents
had all the time in the world. The counseled client will have agreed to that
result for reasons that will appear beneficial to many. Unless an enforceable
bilateral non-representation agreement (i.e., one between the clients alone)
does the trick, forbidding the lawyer’s promise paternalistically denies the
client an option that many will rationally choose in order to increase the
chances of staying out of court. Categorically forbidding the client’s
informed consent to do that presumes, with no support at all, that no fully
counseled, competent adult could, at the outset “of a representation . . . ever
give informed consent to such a procedure.”158 Clients must be protected
from themselves. The result is a “my way or the highway” choice, except
that there is no highway.
Furthermore, denying the opponent the power to prevent representation
in court by forbidding lawyers to sign a non-representation agreement does
not empower the client. It empowers only the lawyer. A lawyer may
properly agree with a client to limit the scope of his representation.159 So a
156. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
157. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. N.Y.
1999) (upholding an agreement among parties that one would not use particular counsel in
designated matters). New York courts have enforced anti-solicitation promises and confidentiality
obligations in settlement agreements by disqualifying the lawyers who agreed to them. See Stephen
Gillers & Richard Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue Promises in Settlement
Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 301–06 (2005). Mandell v. Mandell, 949 N.Y.S.2d 580
(Sup. Ct. 2012), recognizes as open the question of the enforceability of an agreement not to use
collaborative law counsel in the event of litigation, but does not answer it.
158. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
159. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.2(c) (2009).
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lawyer and an informed client could agree that the lawyer will not represent
the client in court if the collaborative effort fails. Of course, the lawyer can
change his mind, which he could not do if a promise to the opponent (by
either lawyer or client) were binding. But if a binding promise is not
allowed, the effect is to give lawyers sole veto power regardless of what the
client may wish. And any lawyer who wants repeat collaborative law work
may decline to go to court even if the client wants him to do so because, if
he does not decline, no future opponent who knows of the lawyer’s conduct
will rely on an agreement of a limited scope of representation as sufficient
insurance against subsequent litigation adversity.
To be sure, Rule 5.6(b), which the opponents did not cite, forbids
lawyers to promise, as part of a settlement or “employment, or other similar
type of agreement,” to restrict her right to practice.160 But the collaborative
agreement is not part of a settlement and the lawyer will have accepted no
greater limitation than that imposed by the client’s own agreement limiting
the scope of work for the client herself, as Rule 1.2(c) permits. The
comment to the rule, furthermore, tells us that the rule is meant to ensure the
lawyer’s availability to “other persons.”161
Collaborative law hurts the weaker litigant, especially women. This is a
more specific example of the paternalism that animates the prior argument,
except that this argument relies on a prediction of the consequences of a
collaborative law regime for more vulnerable clients and apparently all
women. Women and vulnerable clients need to be protected, goes the claim,
from the risk that they might elect collaborative law and regret it later when
they have to hire new counsel to litigate and lack the resources to do so. A
devious party may, in this imagining, go through the collaborative motions
with no intention of reaching an agreement but with the secret goal of
weakening the opponent’s resolve and depleting her resources. The duped
client will then have to pay new counsel. An unspoken but dubious
assumption is that the collaborative lawyer, if free to do so, would be willing
to continue to represent the client in litigation without further fee, whereas a
new lawyer will expect to get paid.162 The same arguments could be made
against mediation, in which an unscrupulous opponent can feign interest in
order to deplete the other side’s resources and stamina, and which, when
mediation fails, will require an expanded retainer and more fees to continue

160. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a)–(b) (2009).
161. Id. R. 5.6 cmt. 2.
162. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES, supra note 125, at R. 10(b) (would permit another
lawyer in the collaborative lawyer’s firm to represent the client without fee in limited
circumstances).
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the representation. As too often happens in these debates, the speakers who
foresaw that collaborative law would harm women or vulnerable clients in
this way, and should therefore be categorically forbidden to everyone,
ventured no empirical support for their prediction. They just said it.
Collaborative law may be a good idea or a bad one on its merits. And
the Model Act may or may not properly resolve the competing policies. But
the argument against the Model Act ignored its content and instead opposed
the very idea. It did so with arguments that fall apart upon even casual
inspection, arguments that no lawyer jealous of her reputation at the bar
would make in an appellate brief and no advocate in the House of Delegates
should ask its members to accept.
As a practical matter, nothing will turn on the ABA’s refusal to support
the Model Act. Collaborative law has a momentum of its own.163 It will
succeed or fail depending upon its popularity, which will in turn depend on
the experience of clients and lawyers who elect it. No lawyer has been
disciplined for participating in collaborative law or is likely to be. But the
fact that the ABA’s collaborative law vote makes no difference to the future
of the innovation does not make the vote irrelevant. It offers further
evidence of the need for improvement in how the Association makes policy
so that it can be a serious contributor to an important conversation about
dispute resolution, rather than just saying no. Perhaps the Association will
yet summon the considerable expertise of its members and propose an
enlightened system of collaborative law, whether through statute or court
rule.
B. Non-Lawyers in Law Firms: The Illinois and Senior Lawyers Resolution
In some nations of the world164 and in Washington, D.C.,165 non-lawyers
163. See, e.g., Susan McRae, Collaborative Divorce Booms as Method to Ease the Parting, L.A.
DAILY J., July 13, 2007, at A1 (referring to the national and international growth of collaborative
divorce).
164. See Stephen Gillers, A Profession If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and
Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63
HASTINGS L J. 953, 1010–11 (2012) (footnotes omitted):
As of March 2009, England and Wales have allowed what are called Legal Disciplinary
Practices (“LDPs”). Solicitors, barristers, notaries, conveyancers, and others, including
certain foreign lawyers and nonlawyers, may combine in an LDP. Nonlawyers must be
found “suitable” by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which can also withdraw
approval. Nonlawyer ownership of a firm is capped at twenty-five percent. An LDP can
practice only law. Passive investors are not allowed. By 2012, the U.K. anticipates that
it will go further and allow what has come to be known as Alternate Business Structures
(“ABS”). An ABS may have passive investors (sometimes called Tesco law in the
expectation that retailers will create law firms to provide routine services to consumers).
Shares in an ABS can be publicly traded. An ABS can offer multidisciplinary services,
not just legal services. Once the ABS structure is approved, there will be no further need
for a separate LDP category.
165. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2007) permits nonlawyers (without limit on
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may have equity interests in firms that offer legal services. The models for
non-lawyer ownership vary. The most conservative model would (with
certain restrictions) allow non-lawyers who actively assist a law firm in
providing legal services to clients to have an ownership interest. This is the
rule in Washington, D.C.166 At the other end of the spectrum is passive
investment in law firms.167
In 2000, the ABA House of Delegates, in rejecting proposals from the
Multi-Disciplinary Practice (“MDP”) Commission, resolved in part:
6. Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar
the practice of law by entities other than law firms.
7. The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership
and control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent
with the core values of the legal profession.
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing
legal fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly
transferring to nonlawyers ownership or control over entities
practicing law, should not be revised.168
The MDP Commission had been appointed to study whether and
through whom a law firm could offer services in addition to legal services—
therefore multi-disciplinary.169
In 2009, Carolyn Lamm, the ABA president, appointed a commission,
thereafter formally known as the Commission on Ethics 20/20, to study
whether and how the rules governing the profession should be amended in

number) to have a “financial interest” in a law firm if the nonlawyer “performs professional services
which assist the [firm] in providing legal services to clients”—that is, is not a passive investor—so
long as the nonlawyer agrees to “abide by [the D.C.] Rules of Professional Conduct” and the lawyers
in the firm “undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1.” Rule 5.1 describes the responsibility of firm
partners to supervise the firm's lawyers. Id. R. 5.1.
166. Id.
167. See Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should
Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577,
628 (2011).
168. MDP Recommendation – Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA CENTER FOR PROF.
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinar
y_practice/mdprecom10f.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
169. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_pract
ice/mdp_abt_commission.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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light of globalization and advances in communication technology.170 Among
the dozens of issues the 20/20 Commission resolved to study—all of which
were publicly disclosed as part of its agenda within months of its creation—
was the permissible scope of non-lawyer participation in for-profit law
firms.171 Obviously, the 2000 resolution could be seen to foreclose
consideration of that question if it remained the policy of the Association.
But it was now nine years later. The 20/20 Commission was charged to
examine the effects of intervening changes on professional regulation.172 A
premise of serious intellectual inquiry is that questions are always open to
re-examination to correct error or when changing conditions warrant. That
doesn’t mean the answers will come out differently. It means only that few
if any decisions are final.
In December of 2011, the 20/20 Commission released a report and
discussion draft that would allow limited non-lawyer ownership in law
firms.173 The Commission took no position on the issue but invited
comments. The issue of non-lawyer ownership had by then acquired its own
acronym—Alternate Business Structures or ABS.
The ABS model
discussed in the Commission’s release was narrow. It required that the firm
practice only a single discipline—law—and that the extent of non-lawyer
interest be capped at twenty-five percent.174 Other restrictions are identified
below.175 In view of the exaggerated reactions that any talk of this issue
170. About Us, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/a
bout_us.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012); ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, ABA CENTER FOR
PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_
ethics_20_20.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). I am a member.
171. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Preliminary Issues Outline; ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS, at
6 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
ethics_2020/preliminary_issues_outline.authcheckdam.pdf.
172. Id.
173. Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law Schools, and Individuals (Dec. 2, 2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.
174. Id.
175. Id. The pertinent text in the draft, amending Rule 5.4(b), read as follows with new language
underscored.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law A lawyer may practice law in a law firm in
which individual nonlawyers in that firm hold a financial interest, but only if:
(1) the firm’s sole purpose is providing legal services to clients;
(2) the nonlawyers provide services that assist the lawyer or law firm in providing
legal services to clients;
(3) the nonlawyers state in writing that they have read and understand the Rules of
Professional Conduct and agree in writing to undertake to conform their conduct to
the Rules;
(4) the lawyer partners in the law firm are responsible for these nonlawyers to the
same extent as if the nonlawyers were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(5) the nonlawyers have no power to direct or control the professional judgment of
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seems to incite, I stress these restrictions. Nothing in the discussion draft
envisioned passive investment in or corporate ownership of law firms.
Two related issues on the Commission agenda concerned fee splitting
with non-lawyers. First, to what extent can a law firm in a jurisdiction that
does not allow non-lawyer owners or partners agree to divide fees with a
different firm that has non-lawyer owners or partners in a jurisdiction that
does allow them (interfirm division of fees); and second, to what extent can
a law firm’s office in the first jurisdiction share fees with a second office of
the same firm in a jurisdiction that does allow (and which has) non-lawyer
owners or partners (intrafirm sharing of fees). These two questions also
acquired an acronym: Alternative Law Practice Structures or ALPS.176
In March 2012, the Illinois State Bar Association (“ISBA”) and the
Senior Lawyers Division of the ABA filed a resolution for consideration at
the August 2012 Annual Meeting of the ABA.177 The report supporting the
resolution left little doubt in the view of members of the Commission that it
was intended to stop discussion of ABS and ALPS even before the
Commission had decided whether to make recommendations addressing
either, or, if so, what the recommendations might say.178 The resolution
provided:
a lawyer, and the financial and voting interests in the firm of any nonlawyer are less
than the financial and voting interest of the individual lawyer or lawyers holding the
greatest financial and voting interests in the firm, the aggregate financial and voting
interests of the nonlawyers does not exceed [25%] of the firm total, and the
aggregate of the financial and voting interests of all lawyers in the firm is equal to
or greater than the percentage of voting interests required to take any action or for
any approval;
(6) the lawyer partners in the firm make reasonable efforts to establish that each
nonlawyer with a financial interest in the firm is of good character, supported by
evidence of the nonlawyer’s integrity and professionalism in the practice of his or
her profession, trade or occupation, and maintain records of such inquiry and its
results; and
(7) compliance with the foregoing conditions is set forth in writing.
Id. at 1–2.
176. Initial Draft Proposal for Comment: Choice of Law-Alternative Law Practice Structures,
ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20-20 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/d
am/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-alps_choice_of_law_r_and_r_final.authcheckdam.pdf.
This proposal would have required amendments to Rule 1.5 and Rule 5.4. The Commission
eventually decided not to propose interfirm division of fees or intrafirm fee sharing, leaving it to the
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (“SCEPR”) to address the propriety
of each activity under the current rules. Ethics 20/20 Recommends Helping Foreign Lawyers to
Practice in US, Sidesteps Nonlawyer Ownership, ABA Journal, Oct. 30, 2012.
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ethics_20_20_recommends_making_it_easier_for_foreign_
lawyers_to_practice_in/.
177. Report to the House of Delegates, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SENIOR LAWYERS DIVISION, at 4,
available at http://www.abanow.org/2012/06/2012am10a/.
178. Id.
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RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association reaffirms the
following policy, adopted July 2000:
The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership or
control of the practice of law by non-lawyers are inconsistent with
the core values of the legal profession. The law governing lawyers
that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with non-lawyers and
from directly or indirectly transferring to non-lawyers ownership or
control over entities practicing law should not be revised.179
In supporting the resolution, the report of the ISBA and the Senior
Lawyers Division stated:
The Commission has indicated that it intends to continue its
consideration of the previously recommended amendments to
Model Rule 1.5 and 5.4 which if adopted would change the current
policy. Because of that intention, it is imperative that the House
give its guidance and unambiguous direction as to how the
Commission should proceed. A reaffirmation of the existing policy
will make it clear that any forthcoming proposal should meet the
test of the policy reaffirmed. The proposals that have been offered
for consideration have been given great public distribution
encouraging the public perception that the profession is interested in
allowing nonlawyers to invest in and own law firms. The American
Bar Association should wait no longer to make it clear to the public
that this is not going to happen. The evils of fee sharing with
nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership can
have the same deleterious effect on lawyer independence and
control as any other fee sharing with nonlawyers. The American
concept and practice of lawyer independence is as important to
proclaim and advocate throughout the world as is due process and
the rule of law abroad.180
Thereafter, in April 2012, Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor, the cochairs of the 20/20 Commission, announced that the Commission was
abandoning discussion of a rule that would permit non-lawyer ownership of
law firms (ABS).181 However, it would continue to study the two issues
subsumed under ALPS, i.e., fee division with a different law firm that has
179. Id.
180. Id. at 4 (emphasis added)[hereinafter ISBA Report].
181. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting
Nonlawyer
Ownership
of
Law
Firms,
ABA
NOW
(Apr.
16,
2012),
http://www.abanow.org/2012/04/aba-commission-on-ethics-2020-will-not-propose-changes-to-abapolicy-prohibiting-nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20].
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non-lawyer partners in a jurisdiction that allows it and fee sharing between
two offices of the same firm where one of the offices is located in such a
jurisdiction and has non-lawyer partners.182 In August 2012, the ISBA and
Senior Lawyers’ resolution came before the ABA House of Delegates.183 In
a defeat for the proponents of the resolution, a motion was made to postpone
it indefinitely, which passed 2-1.184
I accept that the sponsors of the resolution had the best interests of the
profession at heart, but the resolution was ill-advised for several reasons.
First, the timing. Dozens of lawyers, commissioners, liaisons from other
organizations and from within the Association, and witnesses had been
working for three years on these issues. That ABS and ALPS were on the
Commission’s agenda was no secret.185 Further, the issues fell within the
charge to the Commission, namely to study the effects of technology and
globalization on lawyer regulation.186 If there was a time to foreclose an
investigation, it would have been at the formation of the Commission, not
after three years of work by others. Furthermore, the ongoing conversation
posed no risk to the resolution’s sponsors. They could mobilize to defeat a
later Commission recommendation on the subject if any was made.
That leads to a second criticism of the resolution, which is even more
serious than the timing. The sponsors apparently saw harm in the mere
discussion of the issues. This is the very opposite of the open and
independent inquiry that the public, the bar, and the courts have a right to
expect from any profession, but especially one that prizes investigation and
fact-gathering and that is exercising a quasi-public duty. The proposition
that certain regulatory ideas are too repugnant even to allow discussion by
an ABA body is intellectually unacceptable and harms the good work of the
Association.
The resolution’s third deficiency is the absence of evidence and
analysis. Invoking the phrase “core values” is not a substitute for reasoned
dialogue, although unfortunately it seems at times to serve as one. If any
core value is present here, it is the value of awaiting receipt of all the

182. Id. As stated, even these ideas were eventually dropped in favor of referrals to SCEPR. See
supra note 176.
183. ISBA Raises Issue of Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms Before ABA House of Delegates,
ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/08/08/isba-raises-issue-nonlawyer-ownershiplaw-firms-aba-house-delegates (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
184. There was no official headcount. Proponents and opponents were asked to stand. I was
present and I estimate that there was a 2-1 vote to postpone. Others with whom I spoke confirmed
this estimate.
185. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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evidence before passing judgment.187 Even worse, the label “evils” in the
sponsor’s report substitutes name-calling for argument and has no place in
the policymaking responsibilities of the Association. If the Commission
were to make a recommendation on ABS or ALPS, it would be accompanied
by a report explaining the factual and legal support for it. But the
resolution’s sponsors preferred to substitute “evils” and save all that work.
They offer no analysis, no research. There is no citation to the one bar ethics
opinion that concluded that a law firm could divide legal fees with another
firm notwithstanding that the second firm had a non-lawyer partner in a
jurisdiction that allowed it.188 There is no explanation of the line of
causation that leads to the assertion that any ALPS and ABS proposal
threatens a “core value” of the profession. There is no analysis of the ABA
ethics committee opinion189 that has addressed how law firms with offices in
both jurisdictions allowing non-lawyer partners and jurisdictions disallowing
them might properly operate under current rules. There is no recognition
that even today non-lawyers can be compensated entirely through a profit
sharing plan190 or how this authority should influence the closely related
matter of participation in fees. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently
recognized in allowing non-lawyer participation in income from specific
cases, fees are the main or only ingredient in law firm profits.191 There is no
cognizance of the possibility that in the dozen years since the 2000 ABA
resolution quoted above,192 new evidence might commend a different result,
or that, at least, this question is worth study by those with a public
responsibility. That indeed is what the Commission was charged to do, but
apparently the sponsors had no interest in the fruits of its ongoing
investigation. Why let investigations get in the way of belief? It was
enough to say that the very prospect of fee sharing in any form perpetuates
an “evil” and leave it at that. Better to just shut it down.
Boiled down to its essentials, the ISBA and Senior Lawyers Division
disregarded what is (or should be) a bedrock principle. It is that lawyers
should not make arguments for or against a position on the rules governing
lawyers without serious legal analysis of a quality that a judge would put in
an opinion or a lawyer would be proud to put in a brief. The ISBA and

187. I pass over the affront of describing as “evil” any form of law firm ownership by a nonlawyer.
188. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2010-7 (2010), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/C
MSResources/Opinion_2010-7Final.pdf.
189. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 360 (1991).
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(3) (2009).
191. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 817 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2012).
192. See Multidisciplinary Recommendation, AM. BAR ASS’N, ET AL., http://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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Senior Lawyers resolution ignored this principle. We could and should say
that the House vote not to interrupt the work of the Commission despite the
alarm with which American lawyers may or may not view the prospect of
non-lawyer participation in legal fees reflects well on the body and the
profession. But the fact remains that one out of three House members was
willing to stifle the investigation before it even reached conclusions on
issues it was asked to address; and two venerable groups—the ISBA and the
Senior Lawyers—lobbied hard to do so, using arguments and an epithet that
should have no place in serious discourse.
C. Written Fee Agreements
Rule 1.5(b) states:
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee
and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a
reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when
the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same
basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses
shall also be communicated to the client.193
Why is a written communication merely preferable? Why aren’t
lawyers required to communicate fee changes in writing?
Twice, ABA commissions recommended that written agreements should
be required with a few minor exceptions.194 Twice, the Association’s House
of Delegates turned the requirement into a mere preference.195 A writing
stating the client’s financial obligations (including for expenses) and the
scope of work is good for clients. It avoids misunderstanding and different
recollections. It poses no apparent disadvantage. So it would seem that the
bar should quickly endorse the requirement. Yet the ABA has not. Why
not?
A harsh explanation is that lack of clarity is good for lawyers. In the
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(b) (2009).
194. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 62–63.
The Reporters Explanation for that
recommendation as part of the Ethics 2000 Commission’s work states: “Few issues between lawyer
and client produce more misunderstandings and disputes than the fee due the lawyer. . . . The
Commission believes that the time has come to minimize misunderstandings by requiring the notice
to be in writing . . .” with minor exceptions. ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at 91 (2006) [hereinafter A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
195. Id.
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event of later disagreement, lawyers will be in a better position to prevail. A
fee dispute that lands in court or arbitration means the client will ordinarily
need to hire new counsel and a lack of a writing increases the likelihood of a
need for (a costly) trial. While this may not trouble powerful clients, it will
be a significant impediment for small businesses and most individuals.
Institutional clients (the Fortune 500, say) have in-house counsel and know
enough to insist on a written agreement and have leverage to get one. Or
they write their own. They are repeat users of legal services whom lawyers
do not wish to antagonize.
That’s the harsh explanation. A less harsh explanation for the absence
of a writing requirement posits that it is often not possible to know what the
fee arrangement or scope of work will be when a matter begins because
there are too many uncertainties. But this explanation is wrong because the
rule itself says that the “scope of the representation and the basis or rate . . .
shall be communicated” at the outset of the matter.196 The rule already
assumes that lawyers know enough in the beginning to provide this
information and must do so. If there are contingencies that may affect the
representation and cannot then be known, they can be described. The rule
also acknowledges the possibility of a need for changes and provides that
these “shall also be communicated to the client.”197 But, again, they need
not be in writing.
A third explanation, and one that was voiced when the writing
requirement was removed the first time around, is that it would subject a
lawyer who forgot to provide a written fee agreement to professional
discipline.198 This explanation is unconvincing. Writing requirements
appear many places in the Model Rules. Contingent fee agreements must be
in writing.199 In 2002, when the ABA rejected a written fee agreement for
the second time, it also required that consent to various lawyer conflicts be
“confirmed in writing.”200 A written agreement is required when two
lawyers in different firms divide fees.201 There are writing requirements for
business transactions and financial agreements between lawyers and
clients.202 Aggregate settlements must be in writing.203 Failure to have a
writing in these circumstances can also, at least in theory, lead to discipline.

196. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(b) (2009) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. The State Bar of Michigan moved for the inclusion of the word “preferably” because of
“concern that imposing a writing requirement would result in disciplinary action against a lawyer
who failed to have a written agreement.” A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 194, at 80.
199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2009).
200. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(b).
201. Id. R. 1.5(e).
202. Id. R. 1.8(a).
203. Id. R. 1.8(g). This rule also requires a writing for an aggregate agreement to plead guilty or
nolo contendere. Id.
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So why balk at a writing requirement for non-contingent fee agreements?
Furthermore, lawyers who do not provide a written fee agreement in
jurisdictions that require them are in fact not disciplined.204 They may not
then be able to enforce their oral agreement and may be relegated to
quantum meruit.205 Similarly, lawyers who fail to follow the writing
requirements for division of fees may recover in quantum meruit.206 They
are not disciplined.207
Unfortunately, we are left then with the first, harsh explanation.
Lawyers may not want to put the scope of work and the client’s financial
obligations in writing for whatever advantage lack of clarity may appear to
afford lawyers, and notwithstanding the unalloyed benefit to clients,
especially small clients.208 Of course, this is not true for all lawyers, many of
whom see a written fee agreement as beneficial to them as well.209
If the professional responsibility of the legal profession is to protect the
interests of clients ahead of those of lawyers, unless the balance of
advantage substantially favors the interests of the lawyers, there is no better
example of the failure of this duty than the rejection of a mandatory written
agreement describing the client’s fee obligations and the scope of work.
Lawyers have advanced no valid reason to reject a writing requirement and
clients have good reason to want it. Some courts agree. At least ten
jurisdictions, including California, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Washington, D.C., generally require a written fee agreement.210
VII. WHEN THE INTERESTS OF LAWYERS AND CLIENTS CLASH: THE
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
As between the interests of lawyers and those of clients, when the bar
proposes rules governing lawyers, it is client interests that should
presumptively control. But it is a presumption only because lawyers do have
legitimate interests in their own right, like career development and mobility.
204. See, e.g., Starkey, Kelly, Blaney, & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238 (N.J. 2002)
(allowing quantum meruit despite failure to reduce contingent fee agreement to writing).
205. Id.
206. Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 84 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a lawyer may
recover quantum meruit).
207. Id. It would be exceedingly odd for a court that believed a lawyer deserved discipline for
failure to reduce a fee agreement to writing as required by the court’s rule nonetheless to reward the
lawyer with a quantum meruit recovery.
208. Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement
Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 102–03 (1998).
209. Id.
210. See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 63–68.
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Whether and to what extent lawyers must subordinate these interests to those
of clients should depend on the strength of the relative interests. The
presumption can be rebutted.
Screening is an example of a rule in which the presumption was
rebutted.211 The question arises when a lawyer who is personally conflicted
in a matter moves from one private law office to another.212 Is her conflict
imputed to other lawyers in the new firm? If so, lawyer mobility is
hindered. Or should we instead allow the new firm to screen this lateral
lawyer on arrival and thereby avoid imputation?213 From the perspective of a
client who does not benefit from the lawyer’s move to a new firm, screening
should not be allowed. That avoids any risk that the lateral lawyer will
reveal, even if unintentionally, confidential information that the lawyer’s
new firm can then use adversely to the client. But if the screening
procedures can be formidable enough to significantly reduce that risk,
perhaps the interest in lawyer mobility should prevail.214 This is actually a
bit more complicated because on the pro-screening side of the ledger are the
interests of those of the lawyer’s other clients who would benefit from the
lawyer’s move to the new firm.215 But whether or not there are other such
clients, the screening question offers one circumstance where the
presumption in favor of a client’s interests can be, and has been, rebutted.216
VIII. HOW TO IMPROVE THE BAR’S CONTRIBUTION TO SELF-REGULATION
I offer a few simple ways in which the profession can credibly fulfill its
public responsibility to the courts and the system of justice when it proposes
rules governing the conduct of lawyers.
A. Intellectual Quality
The standards for arguments for or against a rule should be as high as
the standards for argument in judicial opinions, law review articles, and
briefs to courts. That includes footnote support for all claims of fact or law
and for predictions about the probable effect of a rule.

211. Amanda Kay Morgan, Screening Out Conflict-Of-Interest Issues Involving Former Clients:
Effectuating Client Choice and Lawyer Autonomy While Protecting Client Confidences, 28 J. LEGAL
PROF. 197, 198 (2003–2004).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 199.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. In 2009, the ABA amended Rule 1.10 to allow screening in these circumstances conditioned
on various notice requirements to assure compliance with the screen. See GILLERS ET AL., supra
note 26, at 149–50.
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B. Empirical Predictions
Any factual prediction of dire or beneficial consequences if a rule is or
is not adopted should be supported with credible empirical research if
possible. Who would do it? The bar might investigate the availability of
experts on empirical research—which includes academic lawyers—who
might be willing to help without charge. If the claim is that the particular
prediction is not susceptible to empirical proof or that conducting an
empirical investigation would be too costly, that fact should be candidly
acknowledged. Or the claim may be that because the intuitive likelihood of
the prediction is sufficiently great, it should be presumed correct.217
The empirical issue may be more subtle. It may be that the truth or
falsity of the prediction of harm cannot easily be verified (or verified at all),
but that the level of harm if the prediction is correct but ignored is greater
than the level of harm if the prediction is adopted but wrong. Therefore, the
burden of disproving the prediction should lie with its opponents. If that is
the claim—and it may be perfectly plausible in a particular circumstance—it
should be identified explicitly. For example, opponents of an exception to
confidentiality may predict that it will impede client candor to such an
appreciable extent that whatever good the exception affords in protecting
others will be dwarfed by the harm it will cause. Yet the prediction may be
incapable of proof.
Or consider the proposals for division of fees that so exercised the ISBA
and the Senior Lawyers Division.218 Their resolution states, “the sharing of
legal fees with nonlawyers, and nonlawyer ownership or control of law firms
directly and adversely impacts core values of the U.S. legal profession,
including but not limited to, the exercise of independent professional
judgment and regulation by the judicial branch of government.”219 None of
this is explained or substantiated. If the resolution’s sponsors wish to predict
dire consequences if a law firm is permitted to divide legal fees with another

217. The American Bar Foundation might be a good source of help with specific questions. The
Foundation produces much research and scholarship but its work is not focused on, and is at best
incidental to, the kinds of questions that I imagine a future committee will ask. See infra Part IX;
see also Research, AM. BAR FOUND. (2012), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/
index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
218. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
219. Illinois State Bar Association Resolution Opposing Certain ABA Ethics 20/20 Proposals
And/Or Working Drafts of Proposals and Affirming and Re-Adopting Policy on Fee Sharing and
Non-Lawyer Ownership and Control of Law Practices, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, at 4 (Mar. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_
comments/isba_comments_alpsdiscussiondraftandalpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam
.pdf.
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firm (or an office of the same firm) that has non-lawyer partners in a
jurisdiction whose rules allow it, or if firms are allowed to have non-lawyer
partners, they should be expected empirically to support their prediction with
more than ipse dixit. If they cannot, they should admit it and either
withdraw their opposition or make a persuasive case that the likelihood of
harm is great enough that the risk should not be run or that, in any event, the
proponents of the proposal should shoulder the burden of proof (a subject
next addressed). The proponents, meanwhile, may point to jurisdictions in
which the favored rule, or one like it, has worked without incident.
C. Burden of Proof
Almost entirely absent from debates over lawyer ethics rules is an effort
to identify where to put the burden of proof when a rule is proposed or
opposed. Burden of proof is a concept with which lawyers have much
familiarity, of course, and it is necessarily implicated in any discussion of
the effect of a rule. So its absence from debates is odd. Often, if not always,
there should be a threshold decision of where the burden resides, a decision
that can be decisive if empirical proof is elusive. (I put aside the weight of
that burden.)
Implicitly at least, burden of proof shows up in the background of some
debates about professional conduct rules. Burden was a necessary ingredient
in the union cases,220 the challenge to minimum fee schedules,221 and the
lawyer advertising cases.222 The losers in those cases argued that harmful
consequences would follow if their opponents won. The Supreme Court
thought little of those claims, nor did it so much as assign any burden of
proof to the opponents. Why not? The easy and probably the complete
answer is that governing law—the Constitution or the Sherman Act—
already allocated the burden to the losers.223 They failed to meet it, which is
why they lost.
For the bans on fee-splitting with non-lawyers and non-lawyers as law
firm partners, there is no equivalent background law to allocate burden of
proof, unless it is the requirement that the state show a rational relationship
between a rule and a goal the state has the legal power to achieve.224 This is
a low burden, to be sure. Yet these two bans impinge absolutely on what

220. See supra Part V.A.
221. See supra Part V.B.
222. See supra Part V.C.
223. See Goldfarb v. Va. ex rel. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (stating that there is a
heavy presumption against parties seeking to argue implicit exemptions to the Sherman Act created
by the language of the statute itself).
224. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the law
prohibiting sale of caskets by anyone not licensed by state as funeral director bore no rational
relationship to any legitimate purpose in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses).
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many may consider to be rational economic behavior. With the right facts,
courts may someday test the rules that categorically forbid fee-splitting with
non-lawyers and non-lawyer ownership of law firms against this deferential
level of judicial scrutiny. The decision may be adverse to the rules, at least
insofar as the bans brook no exceptions, in which case, as with advertising,
the union cases, minimum fee schedules, and lawyers for organizations, the
bar will again be forced to accept changes imposed from outside. But the
bar should not have to wait for outside pressure to confront these issues with
analytic rigor. It should not need an external threat to teach it to be wary of
unsubstantiated predictions of harm. “How do we know that?” is a question
that should always be asked.
Let me zero in on the opposition to allowing a law firm in jurisdiction A
to divide fees with a law firm in jurisdiction B, whose rules permit nonlawyer partners. Jurisdiction B may be in Washington, D.C., which has
allowed non-lawyers to be partners in law firms since 1991,225 so long as the
firm only practices law and the non-lawyers actively participate in the
representation of clients. The Model Rules permit a division of fees between
firms when certain precautions are taken.226 Should the fact that the firm in
jurisdiction B has a non-lawyer partner prevent the firm in jurisdiction A
from dividing fees with it? Although those who would forbid it, as
apparently do the ISBA and the Senior Lawyers Division, do not spell out
why the rules should prevent the fee division, the argument would have to
go something like this: no matter what safeguards jurisdiction B has erected
against the misconduct of, or bad influence by, a non-lawyer partner, that
person can exert a corrupting influence on the lawyers in a different firm in
jurisdiction A, using the lure of monetary reward to induce them to betray
their clients or otherwise violate their oaths. And those lawyers may
succumb despite the threat to their law license and career, thus undermining
the policy of jurisdiction A to forbid non-lawyer partners. I hope this line of
causation is recognized as so implausible that it should not be credited as
sufficient to ban the division of fees even under the deferential rational
relationship test. The implausibility of the argument may explain the
decision not to state it explicitly. Nor should opponents of the status quo
have any burden to show that the lawyers in state A will not be corrupted.
This is a situation where statistically reliable proof (as opposed to anecdotal
evidence) is likely unavailable, but where the line of causation is
preposterous and should be rejected outright.

225.
226.

GILLERS ET AL., supra note 26, at 346.
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2009).
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I do not claim that questions about burden will always be easy. I do say
that burden of proof should be identified and defended when the wisdom of
a rule is based on predictions about future harm. Furthermore, when a
proposed rule interferes with the economic liberty of lawyers and clients, the
proponents should presumptively have some, even if modest, obligation to
justify the interference. Predictions with no evident intuitive appeal or
empirical support should be unacceptable.
D. The Composition of the Committees
ABA committees that have studied rules governing lawyers and made
recommendations to the House of Delegates have been composed nearly
exclusively or entirely of lawyers.227 Since the interests of persons other
than lawyers are implicated in these rules, the near exclusivity in staffing is
hard to justify. What explains it? The most plausible explanation is also the
simplest: the lawyers who choose the members of the committees and
commissions know other lawyers best. Choosing lawyers—and in particular
those who, one knows from experience, are knowledgeable about the
subject, have good judgment, are willing to do the work, and carry influence
with the all-lawyer House of Delegates—increases the likelihood of a
successful committee, one whose recommendations will be accepted.
Then, too, there is the fact that the job of these ABA committees is to
generate rules that will operate in the legal system that lawyers are trained to
understand. The natural inclination is to assume that one has to be “inside”
that system in order to really know how it works and, therefore, to formulate
rules that make sense in the greater scheme of things. This should not
surprise us. It is a bias that can appeal to experts in all fields and with a
basis in reality.
While I do not argue that non-lawyers should dominate the bar
committees that propose ethics rules, I do suggest that other experts can
bring to the table a range of experiences and habits of thought that will
augment (and constructively challenge) those of lawyers. Further, since the
rules serve constituencies other than the bar, having the perspective of
persons who are not encumbered by formal legal training—who are not
trained to think like lawyers, but like economists, philosophers,
businesspersons, or social scientists, or who think like clients because they
often are clients—can improve the product by opening the echo chamber
that an all-lawyer committee can easily become. For the truth is that the
issues are often not that hard and training in legal reasoning and knowledge
about legal institutions not nearly as important as lawyers may prefer to
227. I know from my own experience on the Multijurisdictional Practice and Ethics 20/20
Commissions that all members were lawyers (or judges). Nancy Moore, the Chief Reporter for the
Ethics 2000 Commission, confirms that all but one of its members were lawyers (or judges).
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assume. The absence of legal training can, in fact, be an advantage.
Identifying potential non-lawyer committee members may present a
challenge because lawyers tend to know each other best. But given the
resources of national and state bar associations and the networking abilities
of those who run them, the task is possible.
E. Circulation of Proposals to Non-Lawyer Groups and Opinion Writers
I know from my own service on ABA committees and from following
the work of others that drafts of proposals are widely circulated within the
ABA and to bar groups nationwide, aided by the internet. The scope of
consulting and opportunity for comment is impressive. Reflection and
revision is built into the process. This is partly why the Association’s
proposals receive a respectful, often deferential, reception in the courts. But
although drafts of ABA proposals are publicly available on its website and
reported in legal periodicals,228 the public is not likely to become aware of
them. Especially useful might be the opinions of professionals in other
disciplines and opinion writers in the media. It may turn out that even when
specifically invited to comment on drafts, few outside the law will show any
interest in doing so, but that should not be the operating assumption. Rather,
outside comment should be pursued, not just passively invited. Certainly,
when a proposed rule would affect particular groups in society, it should be
possible to identify organizations that promote the interests of those groups
and reach out to them. Opinion writers and reporters for mainstream
publications are obvious conduits for assessing the public’s interest. It is for
the public’s benefit, not for lawyers, that the rules are written.
F. Open the House of Delegates Listserv
Members of the House of Delegates can email the entire House via a
“closed” email system.229 The House has 560 members,230 so nothing is
really secret. Any member can share an email—her own or emails of
others—with anyone else. They are in no sense confidential. Despite the
certainty of some sharing, the listserv remains formally closed. That means
228. For example, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 posted all its drafts and comments addressing
them. See http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_
ethics_20_20.html.
229. The information here is based on conversations with House members and personal
experience.
230. House of Delegates – General Information, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/leadership/delegates.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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that non-members cannot routinely see what arguments House members are
making in favor or against a proposal. Proceedings on the House floor are
public. Emails that take positions on resolutions before the House should be
public too. It should not be necessary for an outsider to have to ask a
member for a copy of an email or all emails on a particular resolution.
While House emails may have little value in interpreting the text of a
resolution, they do shed light on the thinking of the body. Given the quasipublic nature of the ABA’s work generating rules governing lawyers,
transparency would be much enhanced if the public (not to mention scholars
and historians) could know what members of its policy making body were
thinking.
IX. A PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSION AND
FOUR ISSUES ON WHICH IT CAN BEGIN WORK
Too often the bar has responded to events rather than anticipating and
being ready for them. I realize it is in the nature of a bar association—and
especially a national association with hundreds of thousands of members—
to move slowly. That will always be true. Moreover, it should be true. Part
of the ABA’s credibility depends on its ruminating processes, sometimes
cumbersome, for adopting policy. A futures committee is not meant to
speed up the Association’s responses as such, at least not appreciably, but
rather to enable it to foresee issues when or even before they appear above
the horizon and to gather the data that will assist the organization before it is
imperative to respond. A futures committee might find the lawyers and
social scientists willing to assist in the empirical research and compilation of
data. Its members would not be expected to identify incipient trends solely
from their own experience, which would be impossible. Rather, they would
be expected to network extensively where lawyers gather and with
constituent ABA groups. And the very existence of a futures committee, if
broadly publicized, will generate leads through the suggestions of others. A
futures committee could also stay abreast of innovations in a particular state
or abroad, assess the outcome and value, and consider how that learning
might be translated into national policy. It could propose provocative ideas
(without endorsement) in order to start a conversation and test sentiment.
I offer four initial agenda items for the new committee.
First, and most daunting, is the effect of virtual presence on the
traditional geo-centric basis for licensing lawyers. That basis requires a
lawyer who has an office in a jurisdiction, other than temporarily, to be
licensed by it or have some other authority to practice there. That premise
remains fundamental to the regulation of the American bar.231 What if a

231.
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lawyer has no “bricks and mortar” office in the jurisdiction but a significant
virtual presence there and serves many of the jurisdiction’s residents? Is
there a point at which virtual presence can be the equivalent of physical
presence so that a license from the jurisdiction is required? This is not a
purely theoretical question. Technology may be on a collision course with
the geo-centric regulatory model. A sentence in a comment to the Model
Rules currently envisions that there can come a point at which virtual
presence, if great enough, will be the functional equivalent of physical
presence and will require a local license to avoid unauthorized practice.232
When the ABA’s 20/20 Commission proposed to expand the sentence to
give lawyers more guidance,233 it met resistance on the ground that doing so
might impede the growth of virtual practice across borders, which the
commentators saw as a good thing, or at least one that should be left free to
evolve.234 But if virtual presence in a jurisdiction, no matter how substantial,
does not require a local license, we must ask why physical presence should
require one, as long as the lawyer is licensed somewhere. For the lawyer
who is virtually present in a jurisdiction may be able, at least on many
matters, to do for a client pretty much anything a lawyer with a physical
office can do.235 That will become increasingly true as technology becomes
even more sophisticated.236 If we follow this to a logical conclusion, we
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b)(1) (2009) (systematic and continuous
presence of lawyer in a jurisdiction for the practice of law is forbidden if lawyer is not admitted
there); id. cmt. 4 (“Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not present [in
the jurisdiction].”).
233. The proposed additional language provided:
For example, a lawyer may direct electronic or other forms of communications to
potential clients in this jurisdiction and consequently establish a substantial practice
representing clients in this jurisdiction, but without a physical presence here. At some
point, such a virtual presence in this jurisdiction may become systematic and continuous
within the meaning of Rule 5.5(b)(1).
Initial Resolution Model Rule 5.5(d)(3)/Continuous and Systematic Presence, ABA COMM’N ON
ETHICS 20-20, at 2–3 (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20110907_final_ethics_2020_rule_5_5_d3_continuous_presence_initial
_resolution_and_report_for_comment.authcheckdam.pdf.
234. The New York State Bar Association’s Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, for
example, told the Commission that “the proposal is likely to chill cross-border practice. . . . [T]he
Commission should seek to decrease rather than increase the importance of local bar regulation.”
Comments on Ethics 20/20 Draft Reports Dated September 7, 2011, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM.
ON
STANDARDS
OF
ATTORNEY
CONDUCT
(Nov.
21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/n
ewyorkstatebarassociationcommitteeonstandardsofattorneyconduct_initialdraftproposalonrule1_6_5
_5_d_3_1_7_andadmissionbymotion.authcheckdam.pdf.
235. See Jordana Hausman, Who’s Afraid of the Virtual Lawyers? The Role of Legal Ethics in the
Growth and Regulation of Virtual Offices, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 588-589 (2012).
236. See id. at 576.

413

04 GILLERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/13/13 10:18 AM

have to ask whether it will eventually make sense to ask all states to accept
as sufficient the license a lawyer earns in another state. In any event, the
exceptional challenges that a lawyer’s virtual practice in a jurisdiction from
a physical office elsewhere—or from no physical office at all— poses for
the traditional licensing regime are ones the profession must address.237
The second agenda item for the new committee is to study licensing law
workers to perform certain tasks for which a traditional legal education
should not be required. This idea has been knocking around for decades,
although with almost no traction.238 Recently, the Washington Supreme
Court approved a licensing regime for “legal technicians” who can work for
clients without the supervision of a lawyer but whose scope of work is
significantly circumscribed.239 A legal technician cannot go to court or
negotiate for a client or, without a lawyer’s supervision, do legal research or
prepare documents.240 Essentially, a legal technician will assist clients who
are representing themselves in court or otherwise. They are most likely to
be used for family law matters, although the Washington Supreme Court’s
order is not so limited. The order is detailed and this is not the place to
analyze each of its many strands, except to say that there are education and

237. See Gillers, supra note 164, at 972–79. Confusion, or at least lack of consensus, on the
relationship between physical presence and unauthorized practice can be seen when comparing the
rules in Virginia with those in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court will allow lawyers from
other states to practice any law in Colorado so long as they do not have a “domicile” or “a place for
the regular practice of law” in the state. C.R.C.P. 220(1) (West 2012). Meanwhile, Virginia cares
more about the law that is practiced than where it is practiced. Its rules seem to allow “foreign
lawyers,” which includes lawyers admitted in another state or a foreign nation, to have an office in
Virginia as long as they do not practice Virginia law from that office. VA. STATE BAR RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5. And unlike Colorado, Virginia will deem some virtual law practice from
outside Virginia to violate its unauthorized practice rules. Comment [4] to Rule 5.5 provides in part:
Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph
(d)(2)(i) if the Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous
presence in Virginia for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous
even if the Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here. Such “non-physical” presence
includes, but is not limited to, the regular interaction with residents of Virginia for
delivery of legal services in Virginia through exchange of information over the Internet
or other means. Such Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise
represent that the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in Virginia. See also, Rules
7.1(a) and 7.5(b). Despite the foregoing general prohibition, a Foreign Lawyer may
establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in Virginia if the Foreign
Lawyer's practice is limited to areas which by state or federal law do not require
admission to the Virginia State Bar.
238. See generally, BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS
(1970); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
135–41 (2000).
239. Supreme Court of Washington, In the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28—Limited
Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, Order No. 25700-A-1005 (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf
[hereinafter WA Order 1005].
240. Id. at sections F, H(5)–(6).
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experiential requirements for the license and an examination.241 The plight
of people of moderate means who need legal help is well known,242 and,
indeed, a particular concern of the ABA.243 Lawyers may worry that the
licensing of sub-professionals to do work that lawyers may also perform will
hurt the bar economically. It may, although it may also be that the pro se
clients served could not afford counsel, and so there is little business to lose.
In any event, the economic concern, although surely understandable,
especially in the current market, should carry no weight. As the Washington
Supreme Court wrote, “[p]rotecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any
practice area is not a legitimate objective” of regulation.244
If the legal needs of people of moderate means can be addressed and
their interests protected through the creation of sub-professional
categories—and I think the answer is that they can with appropriate
safeguards—then the bar has a leadership role to play in defining the scope
of and the conditions for a license like the one in Washington. Two of the
three interests in the regulation of lawyers—those of the justice system and

241.
242.

Id. at sections D, E.
As one scholar stated:
Money may not be at the root of all evils in our legal aid system, but it is surely
responsible for many. The United States lags behind other developed countries in
spending on civil legal assistance and has fewer intermediary institutions such as advice
and ombudsperson agencies to assist with routine needs. When adjusted for inflation,
“[f]ederal appropriations for the Legal Services Corporation, the largest source of money
for aid groups,” has dropped by a third over the last fifteen years. Although other
revenue sources have increased, they come nowhere close to meeting current needs.
Funding varies considerably by jurisdiction but averages only about $28 per poor person
annually and in some states, drops to less than $10. At these funding levels, not much
due process is available. In the nation as a whole, even before the recent economic crisis,
only one lawyer was available for 6,415 poor persons. Women and minorities are
disproportionately affected.
The result is that virtually all legal aid providers are understaffed and overextended.
Both national and state bar studies consistently find that over four-fifths of the individual
legal needs of low-income individuals remain unmet. Moreover, these studies understate
the extent of the problem. They do not include collective concerns involving matters
such as community economic development, school financing, voting rights, or
environmental hazards. Nor do they include middle-income Americans who are priced
out of the justice system or individuals who receive only limited assistance that falls well
short of adequate representation. Resource shortages have limited the effectiveness, as
well as the extent, of services; legal aid providers in too many jurisdictions lack
necessary training, coordination, staff support, and policy initiatives.
Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 878–80
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
243. See Innovative Programs to Help People of Modest Means Obtain Legal Help, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/delivery/delmodesthelp.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
244. WA Order 1005, supra note 239, at 7.
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rule of law and those of the clients—demand as much. Doing nothing while
decrying the inability of large groups of Americans to get legal help is
indefensible. Arguing for more public money for lawyers to represent them,
though laudable, has been singularly unsuccessful and is not likely to
change.
My third agenda item for the proposed futures committee is to study and
make recommendations for the regulation of companies that generate online
legal documents for customers—so-called document preparation companies.
These documents can be wills and trusts, the papers needed to incorporate a
business, shareholder agreements, separation agreements, health care
proxies, powers of attorney, documents for recording a trademark or
copyright, real estate leases, prenuptial agreements, applications for taxexempt status, promissory notes, bankruptcy petitions, and partnership
agreements, just to name a few examples. The website for Legalzoom.com,
perhaps the most prominent document preparer in the nation, lists some
three dozen services a customer can purchase online.245
The sources for these quasi-legal services are only going to increase, or
so we must assume, because they can be highly remunerative with relatively
low entry barriers. Legalzoom.com is on the verge of an IPO.246
Courts and lawmakers should be as concerned with the quality of work
done by document preparers as they are when they regulate the bar. The
client (or customer) requires protection. On the other hand, it would be an
overreaction and unworthy for the bar to attempt to stop the document
preparation industry.247 It would also likely be impossible since the industry
can easily move offshore. Better to keep it here but regulate it. But what
should the regulations say?
The futures committee I propose may be an odd source for an answer to
that question because its members—entirely or mostly lawyers—will have
an obvious competitive interest in making life for these companies as hard as
possible, thereby impeding their ability to profit and survive. Here is where
the bar can and must subordinate its own interests to protect those of the
245. See Our Products and Services, LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com/productsand-services.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
246. Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Valued at 40 Times Last Year’s Earning for IPO, ABA J.
(Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_valued_at_40_times_last_years_
earnings_for_ipo/. This article also notes competition from Rocket Lawyer and others. Id. The
planned IPO has been delayed because of market conditions. See Olivia Oran, LegalZoom IPO
Delayed, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 1012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/legalzoomidINL2E8J2EOB20120802.
247. The state courts would have to agree and possibly state legislatures as well. When Texas
lawyers tried to stop a computer program sold by Quicken Family Lawyer, arguing that it was
engaged in unauthorized law practice, the state legislature amended the state unauthorized practice
law to “overrule” a trial judge’s decision against Quicken. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v.
Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating lower court decision in light of revised
statute). Furthermore, all state courts and legislatures might have to agree because the companies
could move to those states that do not, making enforcement by other states difficult or impossible.
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public. Unless lawyers will argue that document preparation companies
always present too great a risk for the courts to tolerate no matter what the
service—an argument that can be easily debunked for many lowdiscretionary tasks and especially in an age when people use online services
to prepare sometimes complicated tax returns—someone has to identify the
appropriate and fair level of regulation.
One place to start is with a requirement of disclosure on the companies’
websites of the names, contact information, and jurisdictional admissions of
all lawyers who prepared or supervised the preparation of the particular
document that the customer is buying. If no lawyers participated in the
creation of the document or its template, that should be clearly stated.
Indeed, a regulation may require that a lawyer have reviewed any document
generated to avoid unauthorized law practice.
A second regulation might impose on lawyers who participate in the sale
of legal documents, and also on the document preparation companies, the
same responsibility for competence as the law of legal malpractice imposes
on lawyers doing the same work. The companies can be required to carry
malpractice insurance, and they can be required to submit to the jurisdiction
of the customer in the event of a civil claim.
Last, a decision must be made about the extent to which the companies
have fiduciary duties to their customers, whether and to what extent they are
bound by conflict of interest rules, whether they have duties of
confidentiality, and whether communications with customers are privileged.
To the extent that these protections are unavailable to a customer, the
websites of the companies should prominently say so. The website should
also clearly state that the company is not a law firm.
These are just some ideas for possible inclusion in a model statute or
court rule that regulates document preparation companies. Surely, there are
others. The point here is that someone must draft the regulations, and the
draft must credibly balance the interests of the legal system in protecting the
customers with the interest of customers in having access to this alternate
(and often cheaper) source of legal services. The companies will not be
stopped and should not be ignored by courts and lawmakers.
A final agenda item for the new committee is to review the governance
procedures that the Association uses when it proposes amendments to the
Model Rules or to court rules or legislation whose focus is the conduct of
lawyers.248 I have made some suggestions to improve the quality of the
product. These build on what is already an impressive, deliberative, and

248.

See discussion supra Part VIII.

417

04 GILLERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/13/13 10:18 AM

inclusive process. But there is room to improve. One possible change is to
expand the time allowed for debate before the House of Delegates on the
most consequential recommendations, which may come along once a year or
less often. Today, presentations are limited to five or ten minutes.249 It is
worth considering whether a total of thirty minutes for argument and rebuttal
should be afforded to each of two speakers on opposite sides of a question of
great significance to the bar and the system of justice. Many members of the
House of Delegates will not have had adequate time to read the reports and
listserv comments that bear on a resolution. The debate will be their first or
best chance to learn the details of the issues before them.
X. CONCLUSION: LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE
I believe the decades ahead will bring more change to the practice of
law than can now be readily imagined and, I suggest, greater change than the
profession has previously experienced in comparable periods. Lawyers and
the organizations that represent them ought to be prepared. Actually, they
ought to lead. But leading requires leaders.250
The women and men who have influence in the bar groups that judges
and lawmakers respect and rely on should be in the vanguard of that
leadership. And, of course, no bar group is more influential than the ABA.
In my casual observation over the years, I have noticed that the identity of
the population of influencers within the Association is fluid. Influence can
be found among, but is not restricted to, those who happen at the moment to
hold important positions, like chairs of sections, members of the board of
governors, state bar presidents, or the president of the ABA itself (who
serves for one year), although of course the influential group will often
include many of those officeholders. A sociologist or political scientist
might someday write a fascinating book tracing the distribution and sweep
of influence within the Association, including who has it, how it is acquired,
and how it is deployed. Longevity within the organization is surely a
contributing factor. So is the prominence and respect a person may have
earned through achievement elsewhere. Trading favors as a basis for
influence cannot be discounted, but my working hypothesis is the influence
is mostly meritocratic. People who are willing to invest energy and time,
know how to listen, have good political instincts and open minds, and are
thoughtful and experienced on the issue under discussion will likely get
heard. I surmise that at its core the population of this “control group”
numbers fewer than 500 lawyers and judges (which will shift depending on

249. ABA CONST. & BYLAWS: RULES OF PROCEDURE HOUSE OF DELEGATES § 44.2(b) (2011).
250. A worthwhile introduction may be found in Deborah Rhode’s work on leadership. See
Deborah Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 PROF. LAW. 1 (2010). Citations to other works,
including by Professor Rhode, appear throughout and especially at 13–14 nn. 39, 51.
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the issue), with another 500 disbursed along the borders.
No doubt inspired in part by my academic experience (or bias, if you
prefer), I am advocating that the bar use standards for law school scholarship
as a model. Why can’t they—the bar groups—behave more like us—the law
teachers—at least on the big questions? I say “more like,” not “exactly
like.” I am thinking of the methodology and intellectual rigor expected of
legal scholarship (although not always fulfilled) and not the particular and
often obscure subjects of academic writing. What I see in the best of legal
scholarship is precision, clarity, candor, thoroughness, and revision. In the
academy, nothing need be settled. Articles are written but their ideas can
then be reconsidered in new articles, ad (practically) infinitum. Questions
remain open. Answers are never final. The rulemaking world does not
enjoy that luxury, of course. But it might discover other lessons in the
academic toolkit. One is to anticipate the future, for which I’ve proposed a
futures committee, and a second is greater room for deliberation of the big
questions, for which I’ve proposed lengthier debate between two speakers on
major questions, lasting at least as long as a Supreme Court argument.
A third academic value is to treat the ideas of others seriously and with
respect. That means rejecting the types of argument described in Part VI.
An academic lawyer would, I hope, be mortified to make the arguments that
were leveled against collaborative law. Or to base an argument on
predictions lacking both empirical support and strong intuitive appeal. Or to
suggest that a position should be rejected because of the “evils” it portends,
with no deeper analysis or explanation. Look again at these two summary
sentences from the report that accompanied the resolution from the ISBA
and the Senior Lawyers Division:
The evils of fee sharing with nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit
nonlawyer ownership can have the same deleterious effect on
lawyer independence and control as any other fee sharing with
nonlawyers. The American concept and practice of lawyer
independence is as important to proclaim and advocate throughout
the world as is due process and the rule of law abroad.251
Really? The prohibition against nonlawyer fee sharing is “as important”
to the country or the profession as due process and the rule of law? Other
nations, including common law nations, including the one from which the
United States derived its legal traditions, today allow fees to be shared with

251.

See ISBA Report, supra note 180.
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nonlawyers in certain circumstances.252 Is what England (or indeed
Washington, D.C.) permits as grave as forsaking the rule of law? Even
allowing for hyperbole, this statement is an embarrassment. Nor was it
uttered in a heated moment. It was in a report from two esteemed groups
and which was presumably reviewed and revised by several lawyers before
its release.253
Any discussion of leadership on the rules must recognize the judiciary.
In focusing as I do on bar associations, I do not mean to exempt courts from
the responsibility to make these issues their own. Bar groups work for the
judges, in a sense, and the judges, who have the actual power to decide the
rules, work for all of us. Judges should not view their job as simply to
review and approve, disapprove, or modify proposals from bar associations.
They should do all that, of course, but reliance on the bar cannot be allowed
to eclipse affirmative action when appropriate. It would take another article
fully to examine the professional responsibility of the judiciary in making
rules for lawyers, but a starting point, by way of positive example, might be
the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court’s rules provide for court
appointment of an Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics consisting of
fifteen members, three of whom are not lawyers.254 The committee responds
to ethics questions from the bar.255 Its opinions may be reviewed by the
court on petition from “any aggrieved member of the bar, bar association or
ethics committee.”256 And the court itself may pose questions to the
committee.257 The court also has a second committee, whose responsibility

252. Solicitors’ Code of Conduct R. 8.02(b) (2007) (allowing for fee-sharing with non-lawyers).
253. The ISBA President spoke in support of the resolution on the floor of the House of
Delegates. He characterized the two ALPS proposals—fee-sharing between two firms, one of which
has non-lawyer owners as allowed by the rules of the controlling jurisdiction; and fee sharing
between two offices of the same law firm where one office has non-lawyer owners in a jurisdiction
that permits it—as “a movement toward Multi-Disciplinary Practice [MDP] ‘by another name.’”
Remarks of John E. Thies to ABA House of Delegates in Support of 10A, ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N
(Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://iln.isba.org/sites/default/files/blog/2012/08/isba-raises-issue-nonla
wyer-ownership-law-firms-aba-house-delegates/jet%20remarks%20to%20hod.pdf. He referenced a
New York Times story headlined “Selling Pieces of Law Firms,” and added: “Whether this article
happened on its own, or as a part of some marketing campaign, this is not a message we want the
public to hear.” Id. The intimation of a concerted, behind-the-scenes orchestration (a “campaign”)
is hard to miss. Id. But in case the implied connection was not clear enough, the speaker added that
the Times “article was followed soon after” by the ALPS proposals. Id.
Perhaps linking the ALPS proposals to MDP was viewed as effective advocacy. MDP is a
“fighting” acronym for the American bar, churning up memories of recent and heated debates. If the
ALPS proposals could be seen as a precursor to MDP “by another name,” the chances for approval
of the ISBA resolution would be enhanced. Id. But MDP and ALPS are not the same, logically or
doctrinally. MDP describes a single entity that sells both legal and other services through owners
who are both lawyers and non-lawyers. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
254. N.J. Ct. R. 1:19-1.
255. Id. R 1:19-2.
256. Id. R 1:19-8.
257. Id. R 1:19-5.
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includes recommendations for changes in the professional conduct rules for
lawyers.258 In this way, the court insulates itself from overdependence on the
state’s bar association.
Rethinking how the ABA understands its leadership role in addressing
the challenges that lie ahead will not be easy given the diverse interest
groups contained within it and the multiple perspectives of its members, a
product of the greatly different (and expanding) worlds in which lawyers
practice and the generational differences among them. But if the ABA
doesn’t lead, who will?259 If not now, when?

258. See 2010–2012 Report of the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee, SUPREME
COURT OF NEW JERSEY PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY RULES COMM. (Jan. 9, 2012), available at,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/reports2012/PRRC2010-12RPT.pdf. Most recently, the court asked
the committee to review the New Jersey rule requiring lawyers to have a physical law office. The
court reference responded to a state bar letter advocating virtual law offices. Id. at Appendix A-3, p.
1. The committee recommended changing the court rules to permit virtual law offices. Mary
Gallagher, Supreme Court Panel Recommends Allowing “Virtual” Bona Fide Offices, N.J.L.J., Feb.
13, 2012, at A1. As of September 10, 2012, the court has not ruled.
259. My emphasis on the ABA is not intended to remove state and local bar groups from the
enterprise. They may be more nimble in identifying matters that need attention and long range
planning. Certainly, in their dual roles as freestanding organizations and constituents within the
ABA, they are positioned to inspire or prod the ABA to explore issues it might otherwise overlook.
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